October 3, 2016

National Park Service

Johnstown Flood National Memorial and

Allegheny Portage Railroad National Historic Site

Dear Mr. Koozer:

Thank you for preparing your analysis of *The Bosses Club.* I sincerely appreciate the time and effort it took you to respond so comprehensively; I ’m humbled. Your input will help me to make *The Bosses Club* the best source for reliable information about that era. My response to your analysis follows and is annotated in (Calibri type style color in BLACK) adjacent to your analysis which is in (Times New Roman color in RED). Citations provided in support of my response are in ***italicized BLUE.***My response has been delayed by some health issues.

Hopefully, you’ll find that my detailed response addresses each of your concerns regarding *The Bosses Club* while still allowing me to present my theory in an unambiguous way, so that ultimately *The Bosses Club* will be sold in your NPS stores. I want my book to be the very best source, on what possibly took place during the specific time period (1860 to 1890) and how it may have influenced the Johnstown Flood story. But all the facts for the time period are not known, kept secret on purpose by its actors, never the less my book lays it all out in a plausible story. I call it “Historical Fiction” for that is the only way to make the case for what I believe really took place; you call it a roller-coaster ride. My fictional story follows known historical facts and fills in the unknown with plausible fiction but well researched and fact supported theories.

Before getting into the specifics of my response to your analysis, I’d like to observe generally – and I hope that you’ll agree with my observations – that the investigation of history is an ever changing, ever evolving, journey toward the “truth” during any particular era. Yet, despite the best efforts of historians, sometimes the “truth” isn’t ever achieved.

Certainly, in the case of the 1889 Johnstown Flood, getting to the “truth” of that era, and especially to the truth of that disaster, has been hampered by how the post-flood inquiry was handled – the intentional destruction of records related to the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club (SFF&HC) – and the fact that legal liability was never assigned to anyone or even brought to trial. The fact is that it was the members of the SFF&HC who, through their membership, owned and altered the dam that killed thousands. Many, viewing that era’s history through the prism of the present day, are amazed that lawsuits didn’t then multiply like dandelions in a spring field!

Recently, I came across the following Scientific News article that, I think, illustrates the conundrum we presently find ourselves in regarding the NPS’ refusal to allow *The Bosses Club* to be sold in NPS stores:

[**http://www.foxnews.com/science/2016/05/09/mysterious-man-in-iron-mask-revealed-350-years-later.html**](http://www.foxnews.com/science/2016/05/09/mysterious-man-in-iron-mask-revealed-350-years-later.html)

Directly copied in its entirety from the article (emphasis added):

 A 350-year-old French mystery has been unmasked: In his new book, Paul Sonnino, a professor
 of history at the University of California, Santa Barbara, claims he has uncovered the real identity
 of the mysterious Man in the Iron Mask.

 The [Man in the Iron Mask](http://www.history.com/news/ask-history/who-was-the-man-in-the-iron-mask) was a prisoner arrested in 1669 and held in the Bastille and other
 French jails for more than three decades, until his death in 1703. His identity has been an
 enduring mystery because, throughout his imprisonment, the man's face was hidden by a mask,
 according to Sonnino. The story was even popularized in the 1998 film "The Man in the Iron
 Mask," starring Leonardo DiCaprio.

 It's a mystery that evaded even famed philosopher Voltaire and writer Alexandre Dumas.
 Historians have discounted the theory popularized by Voltaire and Dumas that the masked man
 was the twin brother of [Louis XIV](http://www.livescience.com/38903-palace-of-versailles-facts-history.html), according to Sonnino.

 "They [historians] are pretty much in agreement that his name was Eustache Dauger, that he only
 occasionally wore the mask and that when he did wear a mask, it was velvet, not iron,"
 Sonnino [said in a statement](http://www.news.ucsb.edu/2016/016743/mystery-unmasked). "They are also quite sure that he was a valet. What they have not
 been able to figure out is whose valet he was, and for what possible reason he was held under
 tight security for over 30 years."

 In "The Search for the Man in the Iron Mask: A Historical Detective Story" (Rowman & Littlefield,
 2016), Sonnino leads the reader through historical records, correspondence regarding the
 prisoner and other aspects of his investigation.

 Through his research, Sonnino determined that Dauger was a valet for the treasurer of Cardinal
 Mazarin, who was principal minister of [France](http://www.livescience.com/39149-french-culture.html) during Louis XIV's early life. Mazarin accumulated
 a large fortune, and Sonnino believes the valet thought that some of the money was stolen.

 "What I was able to determine was that Mazarin had ripped off some of his huge fortune from the
 previous king and queen of England …" Sonnino said. "Dauger must have blabbed at the wrong
 time. He was informed, when arrested, that if he revealed his identity to anyone, he would
 immediately be killed."

 **As for why the Man in the Iron Mask's identity has remained veiled throughout history, Sonnino
 said the blame lies with historians, who "insist on making it antiseptic, moralistic, sensible."**

 **"Life does not make sense," Sonnino continued. "Humans are much more complicated than that."**

All I seek is that we find a way to address your concerns, as detailed in your analysis, while preserving *The Bosses Club’s* fictional account that posits a viewpoint that is neither antiseptic or moral, and which admittedly is at odds with the NPS’ preferred position and assumptions, but not yet disproven or precluded by any hard evidence (if the NPS has hard evidence precluding those parts of *The Bosses Club* which are in conflict with the NPS’ preferred position and assumptions, please share your proof.)

In fact, in some areas of so-called “settled history”, the character of those complicated humans involved in this affair has never been taken into account, to the great loss of history itself. Visitors to Johnstown and the South Fork Dam’s NPS site, and children growing up here, learn the following which are represented to be the “salient facts” it goes something like this:

 1) The dam had originally been built for the Pennsylvania Canal, but was poorly built because of a continuous lack of funding during its many years of construction.
 2) The sluice gate used to control the water level, originally incorporated into the dam’s design, were removed sometime after a breach in 1862 and sold for scrap. Mr. Reilly was paid $500 for the scrap.

 3) The club members lowered the dam’s breast to widen the road across the breast of the dam.
 4) The club members tried to remove a fish screen but it was so jammed with debris that it wouldn’t budge. It had been attached years before to keep the fish from escaping.
 5) An abnormal rain storm dumped more water into the already flood prone creeks until the raging waters overwhelmed the breast and then the dam gave way, not bursting, it simply moved away. As the Johnstown residents knew it someday would.

 6) A telegraph message was sent to warn the people of Johnstown but the telegraph line was down and besides Johnstowners had heard those warnings for years.

Politically acceptable and arguably accurate?

Yes, but so is saying that the World Trade Center’s Twin Towers came down because passengers were flying the airplane when it crashed into the World Trade Center.

Certainly, you can appreciate why I and many others feel that all the facts need to come out and plausible alternate viewpoints and theories promulgated by *The Bosses Club* have been suppressed for far too long.

With my regards,

Richard Gregory
Author of *The Bosses Club* **Analysis of The Bosses Club by Richard Gregory**:

Analysis by Nathan M. Koozer, Park Ranger at Johnstown Flood National Memorial and Allegheny Portage Railroad National Historic Site

Notes on Analysis:

-After reading The Bosses Club, it is my recommendation that the above mentioned National Parks NOT sell the book in their respective Eastern National bookstores. The following are the major reasons why this book should not be sold at either Allegheny Portage Railroad National Historic Site and Johnstown Flood National Memorial:

1.) While the author claims this is a revised work, the conspiracy theory language, that the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club and, especially, Andrew Carnegie, intentionally sabotaged the South Fork Dam so that a flood would wipe out the Cambria Iron Company and give Carnegie a permanent upper hand in the steel industry is very much present.

The Author has published a ***revised fictional work*** (there have been two editions printed – both fictional: the original work and the second edition). The Author has never in either edition “claimed” that *The Bosses Club* was a factual portrayal or historic account of the events leading up to and including the 1889 Johnstown Flood. The author contends that 1889 Johnstown Flood was the consequence of a series of man’s actions over the approximately 27 years after the Pennsylvania Railroad seemingly abandoned the dam around 1862, until which time the SFF&HC got possession of it and poorly rebuilt it.

The ONLY question at issue, then, is whether the decisions made and actions taken by these men were malignant or benign as a consequence of their incompetence, their ignorance or their negligent disregard for others (or a combination thereof). If their actions were intentional, who had a motive?

**To start, can we agree that decisions made and actions taken by man caused the 1889 Johnstown Flood?**
2.) While the author claims the book is a work of fiction, the book actually goes on a roller coaster ride into fiction and then into fact. For someone not well versed in the story of the Johnstown Flood, this book makes it easy to get confused as to what parts are meant to be fact and what parts are meant to be fiction. Many park visitors who have read the first version, that is also claimed to be a work of fiction, actually think the book is meant to be a factual work.

The Author has self declared that *The Bosses Club* is a work of fiction that posits plausible theories to fill in the gaps of what’s still unknown and which may never be known. The author’s plausible theories are contrary to the NPS’ preferred position that seems to parallel the McCullough story:

1) The dam was poorly designed and poorly built.

2) On May 30 and 31st it rained historically heavy, overflowing the dam and it broke.

3) Despite the consequences of dam not having sluice pipes and the club not removing the fish screen.

4) The telegraph message warning Johnstown didn’t make it through because the line was washed out.

5) The stupid people of Johnstown that didn’t heed the many prior warnings and go to higher ground got flooded and died.

In the absence of facts to substantiate their position, the NPS, McCullough and others have also put forth their own plausible theories to fill in the gaps of what’s still unknown and which may never be known. There’s no right or wrong in those competing theories!

Is the NPS’ objecting because the conclusions reached by those who have bought *The Bosses Club*  differ from and chafe against the conclusions promulgated by the NPS?

Why couldn’t the NPS simply acknowledge that *The Bosses Club* is an alternative fictional account that they can’t currently support or endorse based on the currently known facts and their theories as to what happened? It seems that’s exactly what the NPS has done with other fictional works they are currently selling – some of which are certainly sensational.

The factual record identifies several decisions made and actions taken by men that directly contributed to if not caused the 1889 Johnstown Flood:

Fact 1) The flood control pipes and valves were removed;
Fact 2) The club’s members lowered the dam’s breast ostensibly in order to build a road across the breast;
Fact 3) The club’s members poorly plugged and poorly refilled the dam’s leaks and generally did a very poor job rebuilding the dam;
Fact 4) The club’s manager wouldn’t remove the debris clogged fish screen across the primary spillway to allow more water to egress from the primary spillway while the dam was rising. Without the fish screen they feared that the stocked fish would then escape via the only working spillway;
Fact 5) The club’s members did not rebuild the dam back to its original design specifications and never consulted with engineers when doing so.

Fact #5), above, is supported by the following extracted from *The Great Flood Johnstown, Pennsylvania, 1889 by Anwei Skinsnes Law* [Copyright 1997 by the Johnstown Area Heritage Association]:

*“Professional opinions, however, tended to blame the Flood on the breaking of the dam, which in turn was blamed on the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club. Engineering News, which published its full report on June 15, observed that the dam had originally been ‘thoroughly well built’ but noted that the repairs made by Ruff were carried out ‘with slight care’. The report blamed the disaster on the lowering of the crest of the embankment [lowering the dam’s breast], lack of discharge pipes [flood control pipes and valves] and obstruction of the spillway. It also criticized the lack of professional expertise in the repair of the dam and emphatically stated:* ***‘In fact, our information is positive, direct and unimpeachable that at no time during the process of rebuilding the dam was ANY ENGINEER WHATEVER, young or old, good or bad, known or unknown, engaged as to the work …”***

**In answer to your #3), below, the Author agrees that he can and will provide better footnotes, Author’s Notes, and annotations identifying those areas in which the known history is unsettled and *The Bosses Club* has, in the absence of facts, provided a plausible theory. The Author will do this in the next edition of *The Bosses Club.***
**Certainly the NPS must agree that disastrous consequences followed the decisions made and actions taken by the SFF&HC members.**

3.) The book insinuates, again, sometimes as a matter of fact, sometimes as fiction, that Andrew Carnegie, had a big hand in the founding and leadership of the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club, while actual historical documentation shows this not to be the case at all.

There’s no “actual historical documentation” that explicitly supports or directly refutes the Author’s contention that Andrew Carnegie was an “invisible hand” in the founding of the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club (SFF&HC) and exerted influence in the club even though he wasn’t one of its leaders. The Author has NEVER asserted that Carnegie was an officer of the club.

In fact, there are actual historical accounts that document that Andrew Carnegie was, in fact, a member of the SFF&HC – which is something that the NPS has until relatively recently denied until the factual evidence, recently discovered, proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that, in fact, Carnegie actually was a member of the SFF&HC. **So, at a minimum, Carnegie must jointly share in the SFF&HC member’s responsibility for this disaster.**

Further, there are numerous historical accounts that demonstrate that Andrew Carnegie OFTEN acted as an “invisible hand” in many businesses in which he surreptitiously maintained a hidden financial interest and that this was his “modus operandi”. There are also numerous historical accounts demonstrating that Carnegie was a master manipulator who often exerted influence even if he didn’t have a “leadership” position in the organization. See response to 7), below, for more on this.

In other words: despite the absence of “actual historical documentation” explicitly supporting the Author’s theory, and an absence of evidence directly refuting it, there’s an abundance of historical documentation and accounts that support the Author’s plausible theory that it would be completely in keeping with Andrew Carnegie’s character for him to have acted as an “invisible hand” in the founding of the SFF&HC and that he would have absolutely tried to manipulate others into doing what he wanted.

**If the NPS is suggesting that the Author has intentionally tried to portray as fact Carnegie’s involvement in the founding of the SFF&HC, despite the Author’s apriori assertion that *The Bosses Club* and the dialogue contained within are both complete works of fiction, then the NPS seems to misunderstand what is meant by “fictional work”. The Author makes no assertion that Carnegie was involved in the founding of the SFF&HC and has merely tied together an abundance of circumstantial evidence that certainly insinuates that he could have been and likely was even if it was only as an invisible hand in the background, as portrayed in *The Bosses Club*.**
In 21), later on in this analysis, the NPS analyst expresses his approval of both footnote 34 and the Author’s word choice of “suspected”. The Author agrees with some of the NPS’ concerns and asserts that he has no desire to take *The Bosses Club* reader “*on a roller coaster ride into fiction and then into fact*”: the Author agrees that he will, in a subsequent revision of *The Bosses Club,* accommodate the NPS’ concerns in these areas*.*
However, the Author wonders why the NPS is objecting to the Author’s theory regarding Carnegie’s possible “invisible hand” role in founding the SFF&HC? Is the NPS taking on the role of Carnegie defenders instead of letting readers and park visitors reach their own conclusions, as the NPS has seemed to advocate in their analysis? There are many accounts which echo the NPS’ preferred positions, which is why it is so important for the NPS to allow *The Bosses Club* to be sold in their stores: so that readers and park visitors can – for the first time – be presented with an alternate account of that era that tries to present an alternate - balanced - portrayal of the key persons from that era, like Carnegie, who were involved in this disaster, even if only tangentially by association – allowing readers and park visitors to reach their own conclusions.

**How can the Analyst claim that *“****actual historical documentation shows this not to be the case at all****”* with regard to Carnegie’s likely role and influence in the founding of the SFF&HC? Wouldn’t it be more accurate to say – as the Author has agreed to do in the next revision – that there’s no evidence to prove that Carnegie had an official legal role as one of the founders or officers of the SFF&HC, but the Author speculates that he could have had a role by virtue of the influence he wielded, however there’s no firm historical evidence that this was true? By asserting that there’s** *“actual historical documentation [which] shows this not to be the case at all”****,* with regard to the Author’s speculation that Carnegie likely had a role in the founding of the SFF&HC even if his role wasn’t “official”, the Analyst is making a completely unsupported assertion.**

4.) In many instances, historical events are mentioned in the wrong time order. For example, the author mentions the naming of Ebensburg over Johnstown as the Cambria County seat in a chapter detailing the 1870s, while that was a done deal by 1804.

**This is a great example of the Analyst trying to make history simple, ignoring man’s machinations, this mistake is the real disservice to accurate history, so please bear with me as I take 5 pages to explain and document my answer:**

Cambria County was created *after* Somerset County had previously been created in 1795 when Somerset County was cut from Bedford County. On March 26, 1804 Cambria County was cut from Bedford, Somerset and Huntingdon Counties [source: Wikipedia - [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambria\_County,\_Pennsylvania](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambria_County%2C_Pennsylvania)]. Before there was a Cambria County, there was only Somerset County which encompassed both what is today known as Cambria County and what is today known as Somerset County. When Joseph Schantz (anglicized to “Johns”) in 1800 laid out the plan for what he referred to as “Conemaugh Old Town” (which later became Johnstown) – before Cambria County was created and after Somerset County had been created – he included a prominent public square, now called “Central Park”, as the site for the Somerset County Courthouse [“History of Cambria County”, Page 269]. Schantz anticipated that his new town would become the Somerset County Seat because it was at the center of Somerset County which then included Cambria County and was the only county encompassing the land that is now both Somerset County and Cambria County. Johnstown was part of Somerset County in 1800 when Schantz organized Johnstown. When Cambria County was created a little later by the Pennsylvania State Legislature in 1804 they mandated that Cambria County’s County Seat would be within seven (7) miles of its center. The center of the new Cambria County is two miles west of present day Ebensburg in the town of Beulah, located off the Blacklick Creek tributary of the Conemaugh River. Beulah had grown rapidly along the path west. Beulah had a church and school and was expected to become the Cambria County Seat. However, in 1804 Rhees Lloyd donated the Ebensburg land on which the Cambria County Courthouse now stands, even though the Eastern and Western Cambria County borders weren’t settled until 1849 [The Tribune-Democrat, Friday November 1, 2002 “Little-known county facts remembered” by Susan Evans]. Ebensburg and the Cambria County seat didn’t even have a real jail until after the 1870 election after which a jail was built in 1872. The 1870 election had a clause to determine where the jail was to be located. Johnstown had its first prison in 1846.

**I’ll incorporate into the next edition that Ebensburg was named the Cambria County seat of government in 1804.** However, in that next edition I’ll also elaborate on the subsequent effort in 1870 to have the county seat moved from Ebensburg to where Johnstown’s Central Park is located today. **See below: (the next four pages that support my claim)**
From a “History of Cambria County, V.1”, page 157-163 [http://www.camgenpa.com/books/Storey/v1/p157.html]:

 *“A bill was presented in the General Assembly for 1870 authorizing the removal of the county office from
 Ebensburg to Johnstown, but it was defeated. The project then became a political issue, but non-partisan; it was a test of strength between the people of the south of the county against the north who desired to retain the county capital of Ebensburg. On June 4 a very large meeting to start the campaign was held on what was termed “Court House Square”, now the city park [now known as Central Park]. The officers were: President, William Flattery, Esq.; Vice-Presidents, Hugh Fronheiser, Jacob Fend, John Thomas, Captain Patrick Graham [Captain Patrick Graham, who participated in the Civil War as part of the Pennsylvania 54th Volunteer Infantry and is
 buried in Sandyvale Cemetary in Johnstown, is the Great Great Grandfather of the Author], R. B. Gageby, Jacob
 Fronheiser, Jacob Fend, John Thomas, James Robb, George McLain, David Dibert, Henry Shaffer, John Devlin,
 Charles O. Luther, Henry Freidhofs, William Cushon, Morris Lewis, John Smith, A. M. Gregg, Patrick Minahan, Thomas McKeirnan and Henry Gore, also Daniel Good and Thomas McCabe, of East Conemaugh, James B. Pyatt and Peter Rubritz of Franklin, James Cooper and John Lamison of Coopersdale, Daniel Burthold and A. A.
 Parson of Taylor Township, John Cushon and John P. Shaffer of Conemaugh Township, David Hamilton and
 James Burns of Yoder Township, George Orris and Christian Weaver of Richland Township, George Eichensehr
 and Alexander Murphy of Adams Township and Thomas Davis and Henry Adams of Jackson Township. The
 Secretaries were H. D. Woodruff and George T. Swank. An Executive Committee was appointed to conduct the
 campaign consisting of Lewis Plitt, William Flattery, B. F. Speedy, H. A. Boggs, Charles B. Ellis and Charles
 Unverzaght. The [two competing newspapers] The Tribune and The Democrat made it the leading issue. A
 convention was held in Johnstown on June 25, with delegates from every ward and township in the new district.
 The permanent organization was Daniel McLaughlin, President; George McLain and Thomas McCabe, Vice- Presidents; and F. M. George and John F. Barnes, Secretaries. The resolutions presented by the committee on such were adopted, the vital grievance being: “Whereas, the time has arrived when the varied interests of the people of the County of Cambria demand as an act of exact justice the removal of the County Seat from Ebensburg to Johnstown, the great business and commercial centre of the County”, and requesting the candidate for Assembly who would be nominated, to pledge himself to use every effort to pass a law to that effect. General James Potts was nominated, but on the 10th of August he withdrew and Captain Henry D. Woodruff, of The Democrat, became the nominee for Assembly on the Removal ticket.”

 “On August 8 the Democratic convention met in Ebensburg and nominated an "Anti-Removal" ticket. The
 candidates before the convention were William Horace Rose, James Griffin and Nathaniel Horne of Johnstown,
 Robert H. Brown of Cresson and John Porter of Lilly. On the sixth ballot Mr. Rose was nominated. William B.
 Bonacker of Johnstown was nominated for sheriff. The campaign was opened and conducted solely on the
 question of removal of the court house, and politics were disregarded. Meetings were held throughout the
 district. The Anti-Removal party agitated the building of a new prison in Ebensburg which was considered a good
 move to block the Removal people. This event brought the campaign poet to the fore with the following, which
 was sung to the tune of "Captain Jinks of the Horse-Marines:"*

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| --- |
| "Old Bob and Phil may talk and cant,     And Tom and Frank may rave and rant;But that big jail--Oh no, you shan't;     we'll raze it with our army."You know that Bill will not report;     He only pledged himself to sport;But we are going to bring that Court,     with our Removal Army." |

 ***“****Lewis Plitt and others procured an injunction against William Callan, the contractor for the new jail, and the
 commissioners and treasurer, to prevent them expending any money on the new penitentiary, as it was termed
 by the Antis. The defendants not having filed an answer Judge Potts moved for judgment pro confesso, which
 brought the matter to an issue. An attachment was issued for the defendants for contempt of court, but they all
 appeared and disclaimed any thought of contempt, which ended that proceeding and the new jail was
 completed. The election took place on October 11, when Mr. Rose received 2,929 votes and Captain Woodruff,
 2,707. The vote in Johnstown was thus: First ward, for removal, 233 against 31; Second, 106 to 15 for it; Third
 ward, 114 to 21 for it, Fourth ward, 150 to 18 for it; Fifth ward, 166 to 32 for it; Sixth ward, 107 to 12 for it.”

     “The vote in Ebensburg was thus: East ward, Rose 118; Woodruff, none; West ward, Rose 153; Woodruff, none.
 Captain Bonacker was elected sheriff, and Daniel J. Morrell was defeated for congress by 11 votes. Shortly after
 the election, F. Carroll Brewster, the attorney general for the state, moved for quo warranto proceeding against
 George Taylor to show cause why he exercised the duties of president judge of the district court, and on
 February 9, 1871, judgment was entered against Judge Taylor and he was ousted. This was a serious blow and
 was considered to have actually abolished the district court.”

  “For almost a year tranquility prevailed, when suddenly Governor Geary appointed James Potts, president judge,
 David Hamilton and William Flattery associate judges, and George T. Swank prothonotary and clerk of the
 quarter sessions court, for the district court to be holden [sic; the Author thinks they meant to write “held” and
 thinks this is a typo] in Johnstown. The old contest was renewed with vigor. On September 20, 1871, a
 convention was held in Johnstown over which Captain Woodruff presided. Thomas McCabe of East Conemaugh
 and John W. James of Johnstown were vice-presidents, and W. A. Krise of Coopersdale, and John Roberts of
 Franklin were the secretaries. The appointees were nominated. Not-withstanding there were but ten days until
 the election, an opposition ticket was placed in the field, consisting of Cyrus Long Pershing for President judge;
 George W. Easly and Jacob Singer for associate judges, and Robert H. Canan for prothonotary. It was a brilliant
 dash, and was made more interesting because Judge Taylor, Judge Dean and Thaddeus Banks were contesting
 for the prize of president judge of the XXIVth judicial district. The result was as follows: Judge Potts received
 1,447 votes; Retaliation, 924; Hamilton, 1,481; Flattery, 1,262; Singer, 1,009; Early, 938; Swank, 1,470, and
 Canan, 910. Judge Dean succeeded in the XXIVth district. On the same day Samuel Henry of Ebensburg was
 elected to the assembly over W. Horace Rose by a vote of 2,912 to 2,505. The result of this election was the
 passage of the Act enlarging the jurisdiction of the district court, reference to which has been made previously.”

     “The Taylor quo warranto had done its work so well that on March 28, 1872, at the suggestion of Captain J. K.
 Hite, who was prothonotary in Ebensburg, another writ was issued against George T. Swank to show cause why
 he exercised the rights and duties of the office to which he had been elected. The court sustained the claimant,
 and the supreme court affirmed it, whereupon Swank was likewise ousted. It was not a difficult matter for an
 attorney or suitor to know what was going on in the jury room after the jury retired. On this occasion an
 important case was being tried, and the jury having gone to their room had agreed upon a verdict against the
 client of Colonel Kopelin which of course came to his knowledge. He had also received private information that
 Mr. Swank had been ousted by the supreme court, therefore, Colonel Kopelin immediately moved to have the
 jury discharged, inasmuch as there had been no legal clerk of the court during the trial. The jury, filed in to
 record their verdict. Judge Potts received it on the ground that the court had "no official notice of the removal of
 Mr. Swank." The opinion of Mr. Justice Agnew was considered so broad that it virtually ended the district court,
 which remained suspended from July, 1872, until after the amended Act of April, 1873. Samuel Henry was
 friendly to the removal cause, and through his influence the bill became a law.”*

 *“On Aril 9, 1873, Governor Hartranft reappointed George T. Swank clerk of the district court, who reassumed the
 duties attached to the position. On May 13, the county commissioners leased for a court house Parke's Opera
 House, and the second floor of the Benton building, which adjoined it on the west. The opposition endeavored
 to have the Union Hall, Fronheiser's Hall, or the Episcopal church selected for the court house, but for the time
 being were unsuccessful. George W. Cope and Henry H. Kuhn were admitted to practice law in March, and
 Oliver J. Young and John H. Brown in September, 1873.”

 “On May 12, 1873, another writ of quo warranto was issued commanding Judge Potts to show cause why he
 assumed and exercised the power of president judge of the district court. On the return day Henry D. Foster of
 Greensburg and John Scott of Huntingdon appeared for Judge Potts and moved for a continuance. It was
 granted on the condition that he would not exercise any duty of the court, excepting to convene and adjourn
 the court until the final decision was made. This condition existed until October, when Judge Potts was removed.
 Notwithstanding the Union Hall had not been leased for the use of the court. Judge Potts moved thither on July
 7, 1873, and opened court and was about to adjourn under the condition imposed, when Colonel Linton moved
 for the trial or the discharge of a client who had been indicted for a serious offense. Judge Potts directed the
 crier to adjourn the court until the first Monday of October. While this was going on in the Union Hall, another
 court had been convened in Parke's Opera House, which was attended by Sheriff Bonacker, Treasurer John Cox,
 Associate Judge David Hamilton, and George T. Swank, clerk of the court. The attorneys present were Colonel
 Kopelin, R. L. Johnston, W. H. Sechler, W. Horace Rose, Daniel McLaughlin, Jacob Zimmerman, and H. H. Kuhn.
 Subsequently Colonel Linton appeared. Judge Hamilton directed Crier Markey to open the court, which he did in
 his inimitable way. The commission issued by Governor Hartranft appointing Mr. Swank clerk, etc., was read and
 recorded. Colonel Kopelin and Colonel Linton then made the same motion in this court as Linton had made
 before Judge Potts sitting in the Union Hall. The motion was filed, and Judge Hamilton adjourned it until the first
 Monday of October. Mr. Swank did not personally act as clerk of the court, he continuing as editor and publisher
 of the Tribune. Captain Kuhn was his deputy until the latter part of 1872, when John H. Brown succeeded and
 served until his term expired.”

 “On September 19, 1873, a petition requesting the electors to choose two delegates--one Republican and one
 Democrat--to meet in convention to nominate a candidate for clerk of the court, was addressed to "The Voters
 residing within the limits of the District Court." It was numerously signed, beginning with Gale Heslop and
 Casper Burgraff and ending with George F. Randolph and D. J. Morrell. The convention met in Parke's Opera
 House on September 27. The delegates were: Adams township: Lewis W. Shank and Hiram Shaffer; Cambria
 borough: Michael Sweeny and Henry Gore; Conemaugh township: John Cushon and D. I. Horner; Second ward of
 Conemaugh borough: Martin Rist and William Cushon; Coopersdale borough: W. A. Krise and John D. Adams;
 Franklin borough: John Furlong and J. F. Devlin; Millville borough: Michael Maloy; Taylor township: J. B. Bowser
 and J. B. Clark; Johnstown, First ward: John Hitchens and Hugh Bradley; Second ward, J. F. Barnes and Jacob
 Mildren; Third ward, Casper Burgraff and William Doubt; Fourth ward: Oscar Graffe; Fifth ward: A. Wigand and
 S. T. Robb; Sixth ward: Hugh Maloy and S. B. McCormick; Prospect borough: Thomas Dunford and John Smith.
 There were no delegates from the First ward of Conemaugh, East Conemaugh or Woodvale boroughs, nor from
 the townships of Upper and Lower Yoder and Richland. The officers of the convention were John Cushon,
 President Michael Sweeny and Henry Gore, Vice-Presidents, of whom the latter declined to accept the honor,
 and Jacob Mildren was chosen. J. B. Adams and W. A. Krise were the secretaries. Lucian D. Woodruff was
 nominated by acclamation for clerk of the court. Notwithstanding the unanimity in the proceeding it was only on
 the surface, and deep down there was hot blood among the politicians, and every voter was in that class. The
 election was to take place October 14, and on the 3d Samuel Masters announced that he would be an
 independent candidate for that office. It was a lively dash. Mr. Masters was elected by a vote of 1,443 to 1,294.
 At the same election Herman Baumer was elected sheriff over John T. Harris by a vote of 2,828 to 2,550, and
 Samuel Henry, a Republican was re-elected to the Assembly for the third successive time. The latter and the
 sheriff were of course county nominees.”

 “The first Monday of October, 1873, was the time for the beginning of the regular term. On that day some of the
 court officials met in the Union Hall, and the others in Parke's Opera House. Judge Potts went to Pittsburg [sic]
 that morning, and at 10 o'clock Associate Judge Flattery took his seat in the Union Hall court and directed J. D.
 Hamilton, the court crier, to open the court. The order was obeyed. Those present were: Robert Barclay, a juror;
 Colonel Kopelin, an attorney; J. D. Barkley, a spectator, and two reporters. Judge Flattery announced the
 absence of Judge Potts, and that nothing could be done, and adjourned court until the first Monday of January. The Parke's Opera House court did not even have an associate judge, and it seems there were only two persons
 present--George T. Swank, the clerk, and Patrick Markey, the crier, who opened and adjourned the court. At the
 July term Judge Hamilton had attended both courts but at this time he was absent.”

 “The supreme court ousted Judge Potts, but on October 31 he was reappointed by Governor Hartranft, who at
 the same time reappointed Judge David Hamilton, and selected Robert B. Gageby as the other associate judge in
 place of Judge Flattery, who had gone over to the opposition but is recorded as having resigned.”

 “In the meanwhile the new constitution had been adopted, which, when it would take effect, would abolish the
 district court of Johnstown. In view of this it was concluded better to have one court than two: therefore, on the
 first Monday of January term, 1874, Judge Potts and Associate Judges Hamilton and Gageby opened the term in
 Parke's Opera House, where the clerk had held his office during the turmoil, and where it continued until it went
 out of existence. On May 20, 1874, Colonel Kopelin died.”

 “On October 21, 1874, a petition numerously signed by the leading citizens, among whom were D. J. Morrell,
 James McMillen, C. T. Frazer, W. B. Bonacker, E. A. Vickroy, John M. King, A. Montgomery, John P, Linton, Cyrus
 Elder, John H. and Pearson Fisher, requested Judge Potts and Associate Judges Hamilton and Gageby to be
 candidates for re-election, and on the same day their acceptance was announced.”

 “On the 29th a card was posted announcing that John F. Barnes would be a candidate for president judge, and
 Mahlon W. Keim and John Benshoff for associate judges of this court. This was the condition of affairs four days
 before the election, and neither candidates on the respective tickets had been nominated by a political party or
 a convention. It was a lively campaign, but a sort of a go-as-you-please-contest, and the political stilettoes were
 keen and pointed. The result was: Potts, 1,015, and Barnes, 1,247; Gageby, 1,219, and Keim, 1,167, to 1,140 for Benshoff and 1,025 for Hamilton. Judge Barnes presided until the October term had been completed, when the
 district court was abolished.”*

 *“The records were removed to Ebensburg and filed in the office of the prothonotary, and thus ended a court of
 record of a brief existence but of more turbulence than was ever known.”*
**That effort to move the Courthouse to Johnstown from Ebensburg is what I was referring to and it’s not “in the wrong time order”. I apologize for not being clear. However, based on the preceding account, I’d hardly suggest that it was a “done deal” that the County Seat was to reside in Ebensburg and, it’s a completely inaccurate portrayal of the history and turmoil of that era for the Analyst to so suggest.**
If the NPS is aware of other historical events mentioned in the wrong time order, as you allude in your analysis, or whose meanings aren’t clear, please let me know.

-The author argues that Johnstown’s role in the steel industry is largely forgotten and that part of the goal of writing the book is to detail Johnstown’s history in steelmaking. Personally, I couldn’t agree more. I find the text in *The Bosses Club* about Johnstown’s role in steelmaking to be superbly done.

Thank you for your kind words.

It is my recommendation to the author that he focus solely on this. However, *The Bosses Club*, as written, does a disservice to accurate history.

As for the NPS Analyst’s contention that *The Bosses Club* “does a disservice to accurate history”, I’d ask the following: Is History absolute and does it flow logically and in a straight line? As we can see from the recent story regarding the controversy over the location of the courthouse or the identity of the “Man in the Iron Mask”, history is often not settled and frequently man’s machinations confound expectations, logic and historian’s explanations. History doesn’t move in a straight or logical line! So, of course, the answer to the question of “Is History Absolute” is a resounding NO! There’s much unknown about the events and actions leading up to and after the 1889 Johnstown Flood in part because of the fact that there was a concerted effort to eliminate all evidence. Those events and actions leading up to and after the 1889 Johnstown Flood, and the subsequent effort to eliminate all evidence, were not capsulated events isolated from each other. As evidence of this, please recall Louis Semple Clarke’s innocent pictures: he chose to not just retain those pictures with which he couldn’t part, but he took additional measures to ensure that they didn’t accidentally “turn up”. He put them in a tamper proof map canister with a screw lid fitted with a hasp and lock, clearly hoping that they would be “viewed” during a different era! Those pictures were locked up for over 90 years until his Granddaughter discovered them and made them public.

Another example of an attempt to eliminate, or hide, evidence is the June 18, 2016 Tribune-Democrat article titled *South Fork ‘treasure trove’*: from the article it states “Documents resurface detailing club’s actions before and after 1889 Johnstown Flood”. These documents were hidden in an Ebensburg Attorney’s attic and misleadingly the box was labeled to be “No Historical Value”. Who knows what new revelations may someday be illuminated after those documents have been reviewed?

**To recommend that the author focus solely on Johnstown’s iron heritage is a disservice to research; as though there is nothing further to be discovered in Johnstown’s Flood story. You should have told that to UPJ geologist, Professors Uldis Kaktins and Neil Coleman and geologist Stephanie Wojno.**

In doing my research for these seemingly dissimilar subjects I discovered these two stories (iron industry & the Western reservoir) are not isolated, but are interconnected with one another. I have created a 30 year time line (1860 to 1890) and attached at the end of these answers to better illustrate to others why I suspect Carnegie’s deeper involvement in decisions and actions taken during this period that directly had a affect on the cause for the Johnstown Flood. Most people assume that Carnegie had all the iron and steel he needed during this period when the pipes went missing, but he did not. And I didn’t know that either until I did my research for my iron story. As I filled in my more elaborate time line the pieces fell into place like a jig saw puzzle and eventually formed a picture.

In 1862 during the Civil War the dam was reported to have failed in the Tribune newspaper. Andrew Carnegie was the supervisor of the Western Division of the Pennsylvania Railroad. He was in charge of the dam. At approximately the same time he was forming the Piper & Shiffler (both PRR employees) bridge company. And they needed iron because he didn’t have any blast furnaces to make any. But he could reuse scrap iron. The western reservoir contained 81.47 tons of iron, enough to make two iron railroad bridges of that period. The railroad didn’t need the dam for anything. If it was drained empty he could order his laborers from the railroad to go to the dam and have them remove the pipes and transport them to his mills. Edgar Thomson, his superior on the railroad, became involved in the bridge company by having his wife hold his shares in her name. The hole that was left after digging out the pipes, is the hole filled in by the SFF&HC seventeen years later. History accurately describes it so; filled with stone gravel, mud, brush, hemlock boughs, hay, and even horse manure.

The pipes are the key to this mystery, but as I was trained when I worked for the National Cash Register Co., there are only two small steps between honesty and dishonesty: THE NEED and THE OPPORTUNITY.

NCR explained everyone has the need for more money, so don’t give a bar tender or clerk the opportunity to just take money out of a simple cash box, use a cash register to keep them honest.

Andrew Carnegie in 1862 had an absolute need for an abundance of iron and a unique opportunity to help himself to it. By the way he didn’t pay one dime for his share of the bridge business; it was given to him for services rendered.

May I remind you again:

As for why the Man in the Iron Mask's identity has remained veiled throughout history, Sonnino said the blame lies with historians, who "insist on making it antiseptic, moralistic, sensible. Life does not make sense," Sonnino continued. "Humans are much more complicated than that."

**Portraying history as absolute and ignoring man’s machinations is the real disservice to history.**

-Below are 53 in-depth discussion points or issues I found in the book.

-I begin each point with the page number from *The Bosses Club* followed by the phrase, sentence, paragraph in quotes, and/or where a quote would be too large, the reference in question. Beneath this, I have dashed (-) statements refuting the claims mentioned in the book. While some of my points do show agreeance with the author on certain assertions, these points are largely refuting many claims made in the book. Source references are provided for each refutation.

1.) p. xi-“This work has been written by someone whose family and friends have lived the

 history being written about.”

-As a historian, this analyst view this statement with suspicion. While this analyst is sure this is true, this language opens itself up to the enemy of history, “bias.” The popular image of the Johnstown Flood is that it is “Us [the poor folks of Johnstown and the Conemaugh Valley] vs. them [the rich and powerful members of the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club]. In such a statement, the author essentially says that he was encouraged to write this book based solely on his family members accounts, rather than giving the history an unbiased look. This analyst quotes from Nathan D. Shappee’s 1940 Ph.D. dissertation on the flood as to the real issue here. Shappee, quoting an 1890 review of Johnstown Flood works by the *Philadelphia Evening Telegraph*, wrote:

“What is really needed…is a logical, well digested, philosophical record-void of hysterical appeals to the feelings, but placing the unexampled flood on the plane of well-written standard history. The trouble with hurried sensational accounts…is, that however well meaning they may be, they occupy the ground to the disadvantage of the judicial narrative presently to come.”

(Nathan D. Shappee, “A History of Johnstown and the Great Flood of 1889: A Study of Disaster and Rehabilitation,” Ph.D. diss, University of Pittsburgh, 1940, p. II)

I believe that the NPS has reached an incorrect conclusion regarding the meaning of the above quote from Mr. Shappee’s dissertation:

When Mr. Shappee wrote about “hurried sensational accounts”, he was referring to accounts like Mr. McCullough’s 1968 account, *The Johnstown Flood,* which picks up the story only on the day of the flood and makes no attempt to accurately portray the circumstances and history leading up to the flood or even to accurately portray Johnstown and those who lived there then. No matter how “well meaning” Mr. McCullough’s account was, or how well it was awarded, it occupies “the ground to the disadvantage of the judicial narrative presently to come”.

Perhaps the NPS will dismiss *The Bosses Club* in favor of McCullough’s *The Johnstown Flood,* but then that is reducing to a bullet-point laden fact sheet (rife with errors) the history and lives of those who lived in that era, and often misrepresenting Johnstown and those who lived then.

When the Analyst writes that because he considers himself to be a “historian” he is instantly suspicious of the Author, and the Author’s declaration of his local “roots”, the Analyst is revealing his own bias and parochialism. History is completely unpredictable because man is involved and historian’s explanations are sometimes muddled and confounded because of this. My only pursuit is the truth, whether the NPS believes that or not. However, the truth about the 1889 Johnstown Flood is something which some involved have deliberately scrubbed clean by destroying all evidence that they could gather, rather than preserving it. This isn’t idle speculation; this is fact! What does the NPS make of that fact? What does that fact reveal about the motivations of those involved? Clearly, the NPS has arrived at a conclusion far different from that reached by the Author.

It has been almost 130 years since the 1889 Johnstown Flood and I think that ALL persons involved in this debacle have been protected long enough. It’s time to look at ALL of the events with suspicion and turn the cards face up for all to see. Guilty or not guilty, many of the events that took place look suspicious. If someone wants to put together a theory contrary to mine as to what happened, I’d like to hear it. That theory should be available to the public and should get a fair hearing. That’s why I’m asking for the NPS to carry *The Bosses Club* in their bookstores alongside other works about that time period.

**It is NOT the NPS’ role to censor these alternate theories or object when park visitors, equipped with *The Bosses Club* or any other work, are convinced that there may be some truth to the alternate theory and they challenge the NPS’ views.** The Author agrees, however that the NPS is absolutely right to expect the Author to identify when he is providing a plausible theory and Author’s Notes that help the reader to understand when the Author is fictionalizing *The Bosses Club.* And that will be done in the next edition of *The Bosses Club.*
2.) p. xxi-“To reduce the weight of the load, each canal boat was designed to come apart in

 the middle, making them much easier to lift one section at a time.”

-This analyst presumes the author is making reference to the sectional canal boat. If so, then the author is in error here. The sectional canal boat was not developed until well into the canal era and, in practice, was very problematic and almost impracticable. Passenger sectional canal boats never got out of the experimental phase. (Walter Leuba and Robert McCullough, *The Pennsylvania Main Line Canal*, 1973, pp. 100-101)

**It was never the Author’s intention to portray the sectional canal boat as the only canal boat in use. The Author will revise this in the next edition**.

3.) p. xxii-“It took about six hours for the boats to be raised or lowered the 1,172 feet on the west

 side of the mountain.”

-The entire journey on the Allegheny Portage Railroad took six hours. (This information is in various books, articles, and park exhibits at Allegheny Portage Railroad National Historic Sites)

**The Author will revise this in the next edition, to read;** *It took six hours for the boats to be raised and lowered the 1,172 feet over the mountain.*

However the Analyst’s assertion raises the following issues:
On page 40 of Shappee’s 1940 Dissertation “A History of Johnstown and the Great Flood of 1889: A Study of Disaster and Rehabilitation”, Shappee unequivocally asserts that“The trip between the two railroad towns took seven hours for the thirty-six miles.” **Could the Analyst, the NPS and the Author all have gotten it wrong?**

It seems to the Author that some of the following would affect the total elapsed time for the trip from the Eastern Canal basin in Hollidaysburg to the Western Canal basin in Johnstown (and also for the return trip) – the Author is certain that there could have been other factors, in addition to those listed below, which affected the total elapsed trip time:

1) When two canal boats met going opposite directions, and one had to back up to a pull off while waiting for
the other to pass;
2) When they laid the second track;
3) When they went from horse and mule drawn to locomotive drawn;
4) When they went from hemp rope to iron cable?
5) When canal patrons stayed overnight or dined at the Summit Hotel, formerly known as the Summit Mansion House?

6) When the inclines were eliminated by laying track that wound around places like the “Mule Shoe”?

**Did any of these affect the elapsed time for the entire trip or did the trip over the mountain always take 6 hours (or 7 hours if you accept Shappee’s version)?**
4.) p. 12-Reference is made here that the South Fork Dam, in fact, had two spillways.

-As originally planned, the South Fork Dam was probably supposed to have two spillways, however, the historic record is rife with evidence that it, in fact, only had one.

The facts reveal that the South Fork Dam was not only supposed to have two spillways but it in fact was originally well designed and originally well built with two spillways. However, after the South Fork Dam was sold, it was altered by the new owners, the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club, and they NEVER rebuilt the dam to its original design specifications. Instead they significantly and dangerously deviated from the dam’s original design specifications. By lowering the breast of the dam when the South Fork Dam was repaired and rebuilt, the second emergency spillway on the western side became ineffective in preventing water from flowing over the now lowered breast and subsequently became almost invisible given that it was at the same height as the dam’s lowered breast (and therefore appeared as just a wider part of the dam’s breast).

After the SFF&HC rebuilt the dam, the second, emergency spillway on the western side was visually at an even height with the central breast of the dam, rather than 3+ feet below the central breast of the dam as originally designed by Morris. So, it’s true that after the dam was poorly repaired and poorly rebuilt, and the breast was lowered, that the dam then had ONLY one FUNCTIONAL spillway. However, that wasn’t per Morris’ original design and the dam had NEVER been built with only one spillway. The record shows that the water breached, or ran over, at the central breast of the dam.

If, as asserted by the Analyst, the “historic record is rife with evidence that [the dam], in fact, only had one [spillway]” then please share your evidence and prove your point. If not, then I will rely on the timely release of scientific and engineering evidence provided by the late professor Mr. Uldis Kakins and his associates Carrie Todd, Stephanie Wojno and Neil Coleman proving there was a secondary spillway when originally built.

-In a November 22, 1834 engineering report by Sylvester Welch, he stated, “A channel sufficiently capacious to discharge the waste water during freshets, should be cut out of the hill, at one end of the dam.” (Report of S. Welch, Engineer, Upon a Reservoir for the Western Division, November 22, 1834, printed in *Pennsylvania House Journal, Appendix to Vol. 2, 1835-1836*, pp. 5458, and reprinted in Harlan D. Unrau, *Historic Structure Report: The South Fork Dam*, NPS, 1980, pp. 5 and in Appendix A.) This indicates that Sylvester Welch, the first engineer to select a site for the South Fork Dam, concluded that the dam would be fine with one spillway.

With all due respect, the Author feels that the Analyst and the NPS have both misunderstood and misread the preceding Welch citation. Mr. Welch’s 1834 report precedes Morris’ plans for the dam and IS NOT a declaration by Mr. Welch that “the dam would be fine with one spillway.” Mr. Welch COULD NOT reach that conclusion since he HAD NOT, at the time of his report, designed the dam. In fact, Mr. Welch NEVER designed the dam! And, at the time of Mr. Welch’s report, the dam had NOT been designed! Mr. Morris subsequently designed the dam after Mr. Welch’s report, and then updated his design a few years later after construction was halted due to a lack of funds! On the contrary: Mr. Welch’s engineering report was written contextually relative ONLY to his examination of the proposed site for the “Reservoir for the Western Division” prior to its being designed by Mr. Morris, not relative to Mr. Morris’ later design for the dam and Mr. Welch says so himself in his first paragraph:

 *“… I have examined the country along the Little Conemaugh river, and along a port of stony creek [sic], for the purpose of selecting a suitable site for a reservoir for the western division of the Pennsylvania canal.”*
The Author feels that Mr. Welch’s engineering report was merely an acknowledgement that the proposed site for the “Reservoir for the Western Division” was a good site for the proposed dam as the topography was acceptable for the dam’s subsequent construction. As you will later learn from the Author’s evidence, construction of a secondary spillway took a lot less work than did construction of the primary spillway because the secondary spillway did not have to be “cut out of the hill [and rock]” as did the main, first spillway. The second, emergency spillway was more natural to the proposed site of the dam provided that the dam’s breast was built, per Morris’ specifications, to an elevation of 1,613.34 feet, which would have been by design 10 feet above the main, first spillway on the eastern side of the dam (just as Morris had specified in both his 1839 and 1841 designs) with a second, emergency spillway almost naturally occurring on the western side over 3 ½ feet deep and 70 feet wide [and at an elevation between the elevation of the top of the dam’s breast and the elevation of the first spillway].

In fact, Frank writes [from Walter Smoter Frank’s article “The Cause of the Johnstown Flood”; this article appeared in edited form on pages 63-66 of the May 1988 edition of CIVIL ENGINEERING and has been cited by the National Park Service (US Dept of the Interior)] that:

 *“In 1839 Morris stated that: A waste or waterway will be excavated in the hill* ***at one or both ends of the dam, for the discharge of surplus water in time of floods, the aggregated [sic] width of the channels will not be less than 150 feet****.”*

Frank observed:

 *“For maintenance reasons, accessibility and economic considerations, earth and rock dams under certain situations have been constructed with more than one spillway for hundreds of years. In May of 1842 the State had stopped construction for financial reasons. Before work was resumed, Morris was asked to prepare new plans for the dam and specified again that the “waste-way or ways” should not have a width of less than 150 feet.”*

Frank concludes*:*

***“It is inconceivable that any engineer would approve completion of a dam with a waste-way width of 69 feet at its narrowest point [, an average of 85 feet for the main, first spillway,] when the [engineering] specifications call for 150 feet [of spillway].”***

Frank then goes on to write:

*“The original construction contract for the Western Reservoir (South Fork Dam) was allotted to James K. Morehead and H. B. Packer on January 31, 1840 and called for ‘excavation of earth and rock in wastes … 50,000 yards’ (note the term “wastes”). The main spillway as it existed then and does now, is a quadrant of a circle 310 feet down the center, and 85 foot average width, with a maximum height of 52 feet on the hillside and 20 feet on the dam side. Noting the contours of the hill and the way the spillway fans out as it reaches up, it becomes apparent, even today, that the removal of earth and rock in this waste could not have exceeded 34,000 cubic yards. The remaining 16,000 cubic yards was consumed excavating the emergency [, second] spillway on the western hillside ...”*

The reason that less dirt and rock was calculated to be excavated from the secondary, emergency spillway on the western hillside is because there was less dirt covering the bedrock under the western hillside: the bedrock was covered by, at most, only a couple of feet of soil as Parke subsequently discovered when they valiantly tried to dig a trench on the morning of May 31, 1889.

Frank goes on to write:

*“The area between stations 0 and 1+82 is the western hillside. The insert [in his document and on his website] shows this area as it existed in 1889 and remained that way until 1977 when (to my horror) [Frank’s words, not the Author’s] a parking lot was constructed in that area. In 1889, the average altitude of stations 1 and 1+50, where the flow of water through the trench could not have affected the level, is 1,610.24 feet. The average altitude between stations 2 and 10 on the dam (eliminating the washed out section) is 1,610.76 feet. To get a roadway width of 17 feet, 2 feet of embankment was taken off between stations 2 and 10. Add the 2 feet and the average altitude on the dam would be 1,612.76 feet – this gives a higher altitude of 2.52 feet above the hillside stations of 1 and 1+50 where there was no need to take off two feet when the club made the road wider.* ***There is no doubt that there had been an emergency spillway in and around stations 1 and 1+50 at least 70 feet wide and at least 3 feet deep (the missing 0.48 feet can be explained by noting the contours of the landscape* between station 0 and 1).** This area slopes into the area of stations 1 and 1+50, which could have easily been filled by erosion during the 37 years from the date of construction until the break. Even one year after the 1889 break, P. E. Brendlinger from the ASCE (American Society of Civil Engineers) investigated the site and could find “but slight traces” of the trench that [multiple workmen had hastily dug during the morning of May 31, 1889 to a depth of] 20 inches deep …”.

“On the eastern end of the dam[, where the main spillway exists], the only altitude measurement was taken (station 10+50), where there would have been no need to cut down the dam to make the road wider since the northern side of the road is the natural hillside, the altitude is 1,613.34. Since no cutting down would have occurred there, and since only 4 feet of puddle dam construction was needed on the lake side, the chances of subsidence would be miniscule. Therefore, at least 1,613.34 feet had to be the altitude of the original construction since the ends of the original dam would not be lower than the center. Ironically, 1,613.34 is almost exactly 10 feet above the bottom of the main [, first] spillway (1,603.4 feet), **just as Morris [had] specified in [both] 1839 and 1841. That would have left an emergency spillway on the western hillside over 3 ½ feet deep and over 70 foot wide – wide enough to have carried off the waters of a storm greater than the one of 1889”.**

Frank acknowledges that the subsequent investigation, immediately after the dam’s breach, concluded that “the failure was due to the flow of water over the top of the earthen embankment caused by the insufficiency of the waste-way [spillway] to discharge the flood water.”

Frank writes that “the investigators concluded that the original dam had been designed and constructed poorly.” And, Frank continues, the investigators also concluded “that if the original discharge system had been installed and was discharging to its full capacity, if the spillway had not been obstructed, if the dam had not been cut down and even if the dam had not sagged, the water still would have crossed over the dam and caused a failure. In essence, the investigators concluded that William E. Morris, the original designer of the dam who had died, and the original contractors who were also dead [, both easy targets], had designed and built a dam without regard to freak storms (that the area had always been known for) and did not provide a large enough spillway … **However, the original specifications and construction of the dam were not as the investigators believed.** The original dam had been designed and constructed in a way that the “most extensive rainfall of the century” would not have caused water to cross over the dam. [But,] due to the lowering of the dam during reconstruction and the sagging center, the effectiveness of an emergency [, second,] spillway [on the western side] was eliminated. **The existence of an “emergency [second] spillway” was never revealed to the investigators.”**
Frank concludes:

*“****If the reconstruction of the South Fork Dam had been rebuilt to the original specifications and construction, the disaster of May 31, 1889, would never have occurred****. Granted: a break like the one in 1862, when the culvert collapsed, [which could have been because that was when the flood control pipes were removed,] could have caused great damage. However, the South Fork Dam as originally designed by Morris and constructed by Morehead and Packer would not have had water pass over it – the worst possible thing that can befall an earth and rock dam – the unquestionable cause of the 1889 Johnstown disaster.”*

It sure doesn’t sound like the dam was originally “poorly designed” and originally “poorly built” when Frank writes: “The original dam had been designed and constructed in a way that the “most extensive rainfall of the century” would not have caused water to cross over the dam”.

In Project Muse’s “Revisiting the Timing and Events Leading to and Causing the Johnstown Flood of 1889” by Uldis Kaktins, Carrie Davis Todd, Stephanie Wojno and Neil Coleman [Published by Penn State University Press, DOI: 10.1353/pnh.2013.0047], page 339-340 they have written:

*“A key specification of the original plans was that the aggregate width of spillway channels be at least 150 feet, which could be accomplished by a single large spillway on one side of the dam, or a spillway on each side of the dam. A single curving spillway, 98 feet wide at the bridge over the spillway (narrowing to about 69 feet wide downstream) and 10 feet deep, was cut into bedrock on the northeast side of the dam and is still evident today. However, Walter S. Frank [quoted above], in discussing the causes of the flood,* ***makes a******strong argument that a second, much shallower spillway was originally excavated on the opposite (southwest) side of the dam.*** *He points out that “it is inconceivable that any engineer would approve the completion of a dam with a waste-way [spillway] width of 69 feet at its narrowest point, when specifications called for 150 feet”. This secondary spillway would have been about 3 feet deep (down to bedrock) and approximately 70 feet wide.* ***The present study confirms the probable existence of an auxiliary spillway. Such a spillway would have begun to accommodate flow if the lake rose to within about three feet of overtopping the original dam and would therefore substantially increase the safety margin for the dam at high flows.****”*

Later, on page 349, Kaktins and company note that:

*“Frank [previously quoted] suggested that the ditch [cut at Unger’s instruction by laborers at about 10:30am on May 31, 1889] was within the area of the intended auxiliary [secondary] spillway from the original plans of Morris. This is supported by the statement of Boyer, Superintendent of Lake and Grounds, that at about 11:00am, when the water was perhaps 6-12 inches from the crest, water was already going over the southwest abutment. Parke also noted that water rushed into the cut channel and made it a “swift stream” about 25 feet wide; this water width is greater than any estimates for the width of the cut channel. It is therefore important to note that the water started going over the southwest abutment prior to overtopping the embankment [breast] itself.* ***This is prima facie evidence that the original southwest abutment had an auxiliary spillway, for no one would build a dam where the abutment was lower than the dam embankment itself unless it was intended to serve as a spillway.”***

As water was “flowing over the top of the dam in several places by 11:30am” on May 31, 1889, and the dam didn’t “give way” until 2:53-54pm on May 31, 1889 (per the estimates of Katkins and company), that means that the poorly rebuilt and poorly repaired dam, significantly altered from its original design specifications, had held for about 3 ½ hours after water began overflowing the dam’s breast! This indicates that even though the SFF&HC’s members poorly rebuilt and poorly repaired the dam and didn’t rebuild it to its original design specifications, it had originally been built well enough that it held for a few hours after water began overflowing the top of it! Surely that is evidence of a well designed and well built dam!

Yet, on page 353, Kaktins and company conclude that:

*“Modifications to the original design specifications for the South Fork Dam and inadequate repairs after an earlier failure contributed to the catastrophic failure of the dam in 1889. Deviations from the original design that were minor contributing factors include the failure to completely armor the upstream side and [the] crest of the dam with fitted stone …* ***The club’s [SFF&HC’s] repairs of 1879-1881 did not even try to meet the original design specifications and the rebuilding was accomplished in a shoddy and unprofessional manner.*** *In the repaired dam the previous break was filled with substandard material and no puddle clay was emplaced. Nor was there any attempt to replace the sluice pipes [at the bottom of the dam – absolutely necessary if the dam was to be drained for maintenance] or rebuild the control tower, [both of] which would have enabled the water level to be controlled. Rip-rap on the repaired section of the downstream face of the dam was of insufficient size. In addition, improper closure of the remnant of the stone arch culvert[, which had formerly housed the sluice pipes at the bottom of the dam,] resulted in continuous leakage at the dam base.* ***At the time of the failure, only one effective spillway remained, as the auxiliary spillway on the western abutment had been rendered useless by lowering of the dam crest two feet, and the remaining spillway was partly obstructed by a sizable fish screen.*** *Not only had the dam crest been lowered, but insufficient compaction of materials used in the repair of the central portion of the dam caused, at minimum, an additional two-foot sag in the center of the dam. The structural integrity of the dam was further compromised by including plastic clay from local mines which reduced the shear strength of the repaired section of the dam, leading to the catastrophic failure of the upper part of the breach.* ***It is hard to imagine what else the SFF&HC could have done to invite the forthcoming disaster.*** *The common excuse given for the club is that the existing spillway was underdesigned. This is based on* the Francis *report, which states “the failure was due to the flow of water over the top of the earthen embankment caused by the insufficiency of the waste-way (spillway) to discharge the flood water.”* ***It is hard to fathom how the original existence of the auxiliary spillway could have been missed since it clearly shows up in the surveying data contained in the report.******By not taking into account the auxiliary spillway, [and improperly assuming that there was only one spillway,] and also by incorrectly assuming that the runoff into Lake Conemaugh continued to increase up to the time of failure, the Francis report erroneously concluded that [what they had assumed was] the original [single] spillway design was inadequate and that failure was inevitable. Unfortunately, the existence of the former auxiliary spillway is not obvious today [and wasn’t then] because that area of the southwestern abutment has been turned into a parking lot. The SFF&HC always kept its internal affairs secret and even today no club documents have ever been found. Therefore, it is impossible to review the exact actions or inactions that were authorized by the club. Nevertheless, in the light of modern analysis it is quite clear that the club had overwhelming culpability for the tragedy. Yet, at that time, neither the club nor its members were ever assessed any legal liability for this disaster. The members simply abandoned their properties and never returned to Lake Conemaugh.”***

The Author is incredulous that you’ve concluded there was NO auxiliary or secondary spillway in the original dam! He visited the remains of the Eastern Reservoir, near Hollidaysburg, and took the photographs on the following pages:

**CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE – THIS AREA INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.**



Remains of the Eastern reservoir near Hollidaysburg showing the top of the dam’s breast. The average width measures less than five feet across the top of the unaltered sister dam to the South Fork Dam, which has been eroded over a century and a half.



The top of the South Fork Dam's breast facing the parking lot southwest of the breast, where the secondary, emergency spillway had originally been built. The average width of the South Fork Dam measures fourteen feet across the top.



The Eastern dam’s breast is indicated by the yellow line, the secondary, emergency spillway is indicated by the red circle - the motorcycle is parked on its surface; the primary spillway is on the far side of the dam (not visible in this picture) and is lower than the secondary, emergency spillway. The lake was to the left. If the dam had filled to the level of the secondary, emergency spillway then water would begin to slowly run over this broad exit-way, moving slowly from left to right. The key to preventing erosion is to keep water moving slowly; that’s why the secondary, emergency spillway is so wide and broad.

Now look at a picture from the South Fork Dam’s emergency spillway (below).

****

The Park road and parking lot are where the secondary waste weir was located - notice that the level of this waste weir is practically the same height as the top of the breast, which is where the people in the background are walking.

-Years later, when Engineer William Morris was given the task of selecting a site for and building the dam, he wrote, “A waste or waterway will be excavated in the hill at one or both ends of the dam…” (“Specifications, Bills of Materials, notices, Etc., Exhibited at letting of Eastern and Western Reservoirs, held November 6 and 9, 1839, William Morris and quoted in Unrau, p. 19). The dams (both Eastern and Western) could be built with two spillways at either ends, but could, again, be ok with one spillway. Further, there are no specifics in any of the primary sources that state definitively that a second spillway was built in the South Fork Dam.

You have included only part of what Morris wrote in his specifications for the Western Reservoir and have completely neglected the key remainder. The entire Morris quote is cited below and is also cited earlier:

 *“A waste or waterway will be excavated in the hill* ***at one or both ends of the dam, for the discharge of surplus water in time of floods, the aggregated [sic] width of the channels will not be less than 150 feet.”***

**The single primary spillway that was originally built WAS NOT 150 feet wide!**

Frank, an engineer, had observed that:

 *“For maintenance reasons, accessibility and economic considerations, earth and rock dams under certain*

*situations have been constructed with more than one spillway for hundreds of years.* ***In May of 1842 the State***

***had stopped construction for financial reasons. Before work was resumed, Morris was asked to prepare new***

***plans for the dam and specified again that the “waste-way or ways” should not have a width of less than 150***

***feet.****”*

Frank concludes:

***“It is inconceivable that any engineer [but especially Morris, who designed the dam and is ostensibly responsible], would approve completion of a dam with a waste-way width of 69 feet at its narrowest point[, an average of 85 feet for the main, first spillway,] when the [engineering] specifications call for 150 feet [of spillway].”***

**Evidence of a secondary, emergency spillway is still there if you look for it, even though the NPS built their parking lot over top of it.**

-Harlan Unrau explained, “To prevent the water behind the dam from rising to the top and flowing over its crest, a spillway was cut through the solid rock at the eastern end of the dam. The spillway was approximately 70 feet wide at its narrowest width and its bottom was 10 feet below the crest of the dam.” (Unrau, p. 47) Unrau’s sources for this assertion of only one spillway are: John Bach McMaster, “The Johnstown Flood, 1,” *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, LVII (July, 1933), 225-226; Nathan D. Shappee, “A History of Johnstown and the Great Flood of 1889: A Study of Disaster and Rehabilitation, pp. 209-211; David G. McCullough, *The Johnstown Flood* (New York, 1968), pp. 52-53; and “The Appalling Calamity at Johnstown,” *Iron Age*, XLIII (June 8, 1889).

It’s true that the accounts you’ve cited refer to only one spillway – however those accounts prove nothing.

First of all, those accounts could be, and likely are from those who observed the dam as it had been rebuilt, not as it had originally been designed and originally built. The dam was rebuilt so that the secondary, emergency spillway appeared to be just a wide spot in the dam’s breast – at about the same height as the dam’s breast – not as originally designed, 3 feet below the dam’s breast. In other words, the dam was rebuilt to render it ineffective and virtually hide where the secondary, emergency spillway use to exist.

Secondly, you keep repeating that the primary spillway was cut out of stone and cost a lot of money to build. How is that relevant? The stone primary spillway would have stood up to centuries of water erosion. The primary spillway was originally designed to be 10 feet below the level of the dam’s breast with the secondary, emergency spillway about 3 feet below the level of the dam’s breast. Water would only flow over the secondary, emergency spillway if the water was coming into the dam faster than the primary spillway could get rid of it. In that case, the water level would continue to rise until it would gently (due to the design of the secondary, emergency spillway) begin to flow over it. The combined width of the two spillways was greater than Morris’ 150 foot spillway specification, but the width of the primary spillway by itself, without the secondary, emergency spillway, was not. If water continued to flow into the dam faster than the two spillways could get rid of the excess, then it would at some point breach the dam’s breast and flow over the top, which is the absolute worst thing that can happen to an earthen dam. That’s why the dam was well designed and well built with flood control pipes (also called sluice pipes) and flood control valves. Even so, by the NPS own account the South Fork Dam held up for about two to two and a half-hours while the water continued to run over the breast of the dam and down the face of the dam, washing away and weakening the dam’s dry side.

By your own account you state:
 -“He [Mr. Rorabaugh] said the dam was running over from 12 o’clock until 2.”

So, for two hours (or two and a half if you accept the Katkins timeline) water washed away and weakened the dry side of the dam. It matters not how well this dam was built - this abuse would destroy any earthen dam.

-In a recent study of the timeline of the Johnstown Flood, Uldis Kaktins, Carrie Davis Todd, Stephanie Wojno, and Neil Coleman, “Revisiting the Timing and Events Leading to and Causing the Johnstown Flood of 1889,” *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, vol. 80, No. 3 (Summer 2013), pp. 335-363, used later in *The Bosses* Club, to explain the effects of the failure of the Conemaugh Viaudct, claims that a second spillway was probably in place. They base their findings on the conjectural assumption of Walter S. Frank, who wrote a paper on the Johnstown Flood. While the intention may have been to put a second spillway at the South Fork Dam, the dam probably became a victim of the Panic of 1837 and a very cash strapped Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In fact, William Morris, even stated in his November 1, 1839 report that all considerations were made to how the dam could be built cost effectively; using earthen materials because they would be the cheapest. It doesn’t seem like this fact was taken into the consideration for if the dam had one or two spillways.

The Analyst’s statements, above, are complete conjecture on his part. The fact is that the western, secondary (emergency) spillway DID NOT need to be cut into stone, as did the primary spillway, nor did its construction require as much dirt to be excavated (only about 16,000 cubic yards – see prior analysis and supporting engineering studies). Therefore, it wouldn’t have taken much cash to cut down the hill on the western side. It was mostly overburden anyway. They excavated about 16,000 cubic yards of dirt down to a wide level area and didn’t just build up the breast up at this spot. If you can’t imagine what this may have looked like then please review my pictures on the preceding pages or in my blog at www.thebossesclub.com to see what it might have looked like. Or go over to the site of the Eastern Reservoir and see for yourself. I have done so in my research for *The Bosses Club*.

-While *The Bosses Club*, claims it as a matter of absolute fact that the dam had two spillways, the Kaktins, Todd, et. al, report puts it this way, “The present study confirms the *probable* [emphasis added] existence of an auxiliary spillway.” These researchers chose their words carefully. While they believe there was a second spillway, they admit there is no irrefutable fact to that claim and that they may be mistaken. At the very least, these researchers can say that they base their claims on an engineer’s expert opinion. *The Bosses Club* contains no documentation for how the author reached that conclusion. Does the author have proof? If so, show it.

The Analyst is mistaken and has taken this single sentence completely out of context. In this sentence Kaktins and company were confirming Frank’s earlier conclusions regarding the existence of an auxiliary, emergency spillway. In the same document Kaktins and company have written:

*“It is therefore important to note that the water started going over the southwest abutment prior to overtopping the embankment [breast] itself.* ***This is prima facie evidence that the original southwest abutment had an auxiliary spillway, for no one would build a dam where the abutment was lower than the dam embankment itself unless it was intended to serve as a spillway.”***

and

 *“****At the time of the failure, only one effective spillway remained, as the auxiliary spillway on the western abutment had been rendered useless by lowering of the dam crest two feet, and the remaining spillway was partly obstructed by a sizable fish screen.”***

**That DOES NOT at all sound like Katkins and company are admitting “there is no irrefutable fact to that claim and that they may be mistaken.” In fact, Katkins and company have, throughout their study, positively asserted that an auxiliary, emergency spillway was originally designed and originally built at the South Fork dam! As a matter of fact, I wonder if the Analyst would like to rephrase this question given the recent Tribune-Democrat article of July 5, 2016?**
The NPS Analyst goes on to remark:

“At the very least, these researchers can say that they base their claims on an engineer’s expert opinion. *The Bosses Club* contains no documentation for how the author reached that conclusion. Does the author have proof? If so, show it.”

*The Bosses Club* is based on the same expert opinions from which the NPS Analyst has, out of context, extracted snippets of the expert’s opinions in order to construe a meaning unsupported and clearly not intended by the expert opinion from which the snippet was extracted! Further, the Author has visited the Eastern Reservoir and has taken photos of the remains of its breast, including its emergency, second spillway. The Author has discovered the existence of and examined a survey for the Eastern Reservoir. Has the NPS? I provided that survey to the NPS because I was told they didn’t have it. That survey shows two spillways!

The Author’s pictures of the Eastern Reservoir’s second, emergency spillway and the analysis of both Frank and Katkins and company, when taken in their entirety and not “cherry picked” for out of context snippets which support the Analyst’s views, all debunk the Analyst’s assertions that there is “no irrefutable fact to that claim” (regarding the existence of the secondary, emergency spillway).

-Another issue here is that if there was, in fact, two spillways, then why is it always referred to as “the spillway,” and why isn’t the second spillway mentioned in any of the eyewitness accounts of the failure of the dam on May 31, 1889. The following are some of those accounts:

Eyewitness Account of the Failure of the South Fork Dam by W.Y. Boyer, The Bursting of the Dam as printed in the Salem (Ohio) End:

Because the breast was lowered to the same height as the secondary (emergency) spillway! Therefore it wasn’t visible. It was only a wide spot (30’) on the breast of the dam. In point of fact, Katkins and company point out that:

*“The common excuse given for the club is that the existing spillway was underdesigned. This is based on the Francis report, which states “the failure was due to the flow of water over the top of the earthen embankment caused by the insufficiency of the waste-way (spillway) to discharge the flood water.”* ***It is hard to fathom how the original existence of the auxiliary spillway could have been missed since it clearly shows up in the surveying data contained in the report.******By not taking into account the auxiliary spillway, [and improperly assuming that there was only one spillway,] and also by incorrectly assuming that the runoff into Lake Conemaugh continued to increase up to the time of failure, the Francis report erroneously concluded that [what they had assumed was] the original [single] spillway design was inadequate and that failure was inevitable. Unfortunately, the existence of the former auxiliary spillway is not obvious today because that area of the southwestern abutment has been turned into a parking lot.”***

-Mr. Boyer was the Superintendent of Grounds for the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club:

 “On the northeast side of the dam was a[singular] wasteway through which the water went out and flowed around the dam and down the Conemaugh Valley. The[singular] waste way was about fifty feet wide and eight feet deep before it would run over the dam, and in it [singular] were beautiful falls.” [Emphases added]

Eyewitness Account of the Failure of the South Fork Dam by John G. Parke, Jr:

This account is based on seeing the dam’s altered, poorly rebuilt and poorly repaired breast lowered to the same height as the secondary, emergency spillway, not rebuilt to the original design, effectively hiding and making ineffective the secondary, emergency spillway. Please see the prior answer.

-“So taking a horse from the stable, I rode to the breast and found Colonel Unger, President of the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club at work on the dam with a number of Italian laborers (that we had employed on some sewerage work); there were about 16 of them; half of them were cutting a ditch through the shale rock at one end of the breast. This ditch was cut through the original ground and about 25 feet from the constructed portion of the breast. The shale was so tough that they could not cut it more than 4 inches deep and about 2 feet wide, but when it was cut through to the lake, the water rushed in and soon made it a swift stream, 25 feet wide and about 20 inches deep, but the rock was so hard that it could not cut it any larger than this.”

You describe a level area about 25 feet wide and so hard they couldn’t dig more than 4 inches deep. They were digging in the emergency, secondary spillway. The reason they couldn’t dig it any deeper is because the overburden had already been removed down to the hard shale rock when the dam had originally been built. From that perspective, the area in which they were digging was perfect as a natural secondary, emergency spillway and wouldn’t wash away. However, the secondary, emergency spillway was rendered ineffective when the dam’s breast had been cut down so that it was then at the same elevation as the secondary, emergency spillway in order to provide a roadway across the breast of the dam.

-If there was a second spillway, why was any of the above necessary?

After the dam was altered by lowering its breast, the second spillway (waste-weir) was at the same height as the top of the dam and no longer functional because of this. In your own documents the top of the dam is described as being 30 foot wide at one place, rather than the usual 20 foot width.

-“I noticed that the waste-weir proper was discharging to its full capacity, and that there was no drift or other matter to clog it, except a road bridge supported on small posts which were apparently offering but little resistance as the weir was narrower by about 15 feet at 100 feet from its mouth, and this contraction compensated for the resistance to flow offered by the bridge supports. There was probably 7 feet of water in the weir at the time.”

If the secondary spillway had not been made to be no longer functional by lowering the breast of the dam, then the water would have begun to flow over it before the dam breached when water overflowed the dam’s breast.

-“The water in the lake rose until it was passing over the breast notwithstanding that the lake had then the two outlets (the waste-weir and the one cut by the laborers). In this statement, Parke clearly refers to ONE main spillway and then the emergency weir cut out of the rock and not already in place.

Parke’s perspective, and indeed the perspective of all of the accounts you’ve cited, are relative to the poorly repaired and poorly rebuilt and substantially and tragically altered dam, which had lowered the dam’s breast to the same height as the secondary, emergency spillway, thus making it disappear and ineffective. Of course to them there wasn’t a secondary, emergency spillway because it blended into the road across the breast of the dam. And, indeed, the secondary, emergency spillway had effectively been eliminated when the dam’s breast had been lowered to the same height as the secondary, emergency spillway when the dam was poorly rebuilt and poorly repaired to something which didn’t resemble the original design specifications! Because the SFF&HC poorly rebuilt and poorly repaired the dam and substantially and tragically altered the dam from its original design specifications doesn’t mean that those original design specifications didn’t include a secondary, emergency spillway or that it wasn’t built as originally designed! There’s ample evidence that the secondary, emergency spillway was both planned for as part of the original design and had been originally built.

-“I rode back up to the lake 2 ½ miles through the valley and found the men had torn up a portion of the flooring of the waste-weir bridge and were endeavoring to remove the U-shaped floating drift guard that projected into the lake. It was a light affair and was built to float on the surface of the lake and catch twigs, leaves, etc., and prevent their clogging up the iron screens spoken of above.” If there was a second spillway, wouldn’t they have needed fish guards there also; if there was a second spillway, why is there no mention of that clogging up or even letting water out?

The dam’s breast was, per the original design, originally built 10 feet higher than the primary spillway on the north eastern side of the dam and the secondary, emergency spillway was, per the original design, originally built three feet below the height of the dam’s breast, but above the height of the primary spillway. If the primary spillway wasn’t discharging enough water to prevent the lake from rising (remember, Morris’ original specification called for 150 foot of spillway – the primary spillway DID NOT, by itself, meet that specification), then the water would continue to rise until it, by design, would automatically begin to flow gently over the secondary, emergency spillway – all without cresting or breaching the dam. Of course, if the dam’s level continued to rise even after the water level reached the secondary, emergency spillway, then that’s what the sluice pipes were for: an additional egress for the water during exceptionally high flows. However, in the case of the rebuilt South Fork dam, the dam’s breast had been lowered, thus reducing the capacity of the primary spillway (as detailed in the engineering accounts earlier cited) as well as making the second, emergency spillway completely ineffective, since the dam’s breast had been lowered to the same height as that of the secondary, emergency spillway. You don’t need to be an engineer or hydrologist to understand this conceptually and to appreciate the grave consequences it foretold! The fact is that the secondary, emergency spillway had never been used or needed up until May 31, 1889, when it was very much needed. Why do you think they were trying to build up the height of the dam’s breast while at the same time digging and excavating the area of the secondary, emergency spillway? As for fish guards at the secondary, emergency spillway: as it was designed and originally built they weren’t needed as the secondary, emergency spillway wasn’t for everyday use. It was designed and originally built for use during abnormally high rainfalls which caused the dam’s level to rise faster than the primary spillway could handle. The secondary, emergency spillway during those high rainfalls became an emergency overflow. So, there was no need for fish guards since the secondary, emergency spillway wasn’t used every day.

-I went to the new waste-weir we had cut and found it carrying off a great volume of water and at a great velocity. If there was a second spillway already in place, why would this be referenced to as “new.”

I think the answer to this is obvious: at the time of this account, the dam had been rebuilt to something only remotely resembling the original design specifications. As a consequence the secondary, emergency spillway was rendered ineffective and was visible as only a wider section of the dam’s breast because the dam’s breast had been lowered during rebuilding to the same height as the secondary, emergency spillway. To these observers, the secondary, emergency spillway appeared as only a wide spot in the breast of the dam and not as a spillway at all.

-“He [Eyewitness Accounts of the Failure of the South Fork Dam by John Rorabaugh and George Gramling:

John Rorabaugh:

Mr. Rorabaugh] said the dam was running over from 12 o’clock until 2, when it broke [sic], and that a trench was dug during the day on the southwest side, to let off the water; also, that the dam was lower on that side than the other, and that there was a dip of one foot in the center.” He was another eyewitness to the digging of the emergency spillway.

Addressed previously.

-The waste-weir, he said, was not deep enough, but plenty wide enough and was not clogged by drift.

George Gramling:

Addressed previously.

-“’I recommended to Colonel Unger,’ continued Mr. Gramling, ‘the necessity of cutting away the bridge over the waste weir and also the building of an embankment on the breast, but neither was done.’”

If the fish screen and bridge supports were not restricting the flow of the water from escaping why was it necessary to cut away the bridge? And why wasn’t it done? Who did the club’s manager take orders from?

-All of these accounts are evidence that, as originally built, the South Fork Dam most-likely, had only one spillway.

The Analyst and NPS have asserted the absolute wrong conclusion by repeatedly citing out of context carefully selected snippets from reputable engineering sources (namely Frank and Katkins and company) in defiance of the source’s clear meaning as derived from the holistic context of the source. When these reputable engineering sources are understood holistically and contextually, it is the Author’s contention that no other conclusion can be reached except that the dam was originally well designed and originally well built with two spillways. Yet, despite this overwhelming evidence the Analyst and the NPS have allowed themselves some wiggle room by above writing “most-likely”. The fact is that the accounts cited by the Analyst are evidence only that those who came into contact with the rebuilt dam – not as originally built, since there’s no proof that those cited had ever come into contact with the dam as originally built – did not know that the South Fork dam as originally designed and originally built had two spillways. They couldn’t know that because their entire frame of reference was the rebuilt dam whose breast had been cut down to the same level as the secondary, emergency spillway, effectively hiding and rendering ineffective the secondary, emergency spillway, which appeared to them to be simply a wider part of the dam’s breast.

-The second spillway is mentioned a few other times as *The Bosses Club* continues and each time, is refuted by the findings here and also case specific findings for each mentioning.

In fact, on page 13 of Unrau he recounted that Morris had written the following:

 *“This site combines more advantages for the construction of a reservoir, than any other upon the water of the Conemaugh, or Stony creek. It is not remote from Johnstown, and is less than two miles from the railroad. It is situated upon a stream that will furnish an abundance of water to fill the reservoir; and from the floods of which but little danger is to be apprehended; if proper channels [****Note: plural****] are to be constructed for their discharge. The valley is narrow at the dam, and widens immediately above, in an extensive basin. The land intended to be flooded, except a few acres, is covered with timber, and consequently but small injury will result to private property.* ***There is solid rock at both ends of the dam, in which channels may be cut for the discharge of waste water, in time of floods. This fact has been satisfactorily ascertained by a full examination, by means of drifts and shafts sunk for the purpose. Abundance of the best material for the formation of the dam, is found convenient.****”*

I contend there were two spillways and I believe I have proven it in this document and through my research, even though some of the most telling and relevant evidence from the SFF&HC itself has been destroyed. While most National Parks locate their parking area far from the site of the battle or the historic site, so that you must walk to it thus preserving the battlefield or historic site, this NPS site has elected to build their parking area adjacent to and on top of the secondary, emergency spillway, thus altering the topography and destroying vital historic evidence.

**Does the NPS have any pictures or topography maps of the area in question from before the parking area was built? If you do, please share them with the Author.**

5.) p. 12-“After many delays, construction of the Conemaugh Dam was finally completed in

 1853.”

-This analyst believes that a more detailed (can be done in one or two paragraphs) “history” of the creation of the South Fork Dam is needed. The timeline will be posted in a later point. In *The Bosses Club* William Morris seems to get the bulk of the credit for selecting and designing the South Fork Dam, while Sylvester Welch, who seems to be ignored, doesn’t get any credit for conducting the first study on a location for the Western Reservoir. Of course, by including a more detailed study of the timeline, this sheds light on the fact that the South Fork Dam, from its creation wasn’t “…superbly designed,” as *The Bosses Club*, claims on p. 12. Again, a more detailed analysis on the condition of the dam is forthcoming in a later point.

I don’t understand how you can come to the conclusion that “South Fork Dam, from its inception wasn’t “…superbly designed.” Where’s your proof? The Frank and Katkins and company accounts both directly refute this absurd assertion. The Shappee 1940 dissertation on page 209 specifically says “The wall of the reservoir, as originally planned and built, was well made and safe”. In fact, Engineer John G. Parke, Jr., on page 203 of the Unrau document, wrote on August 22, 1889:

 *“I need say nothing of the character of the dam, for it is open for inspection of those far more able to express an opinion than I. But there is one thing I want to impress on every one’s mind, and that is, that the dam did not break, but was washed by the water passing over it from 11:30 o’clock A.M. until nearly 3 P.M. until the dam was made so thin at one point, that it could not withstand the pressure of the water behind it, and the water once rushing though this trough nothing could withstand it.”*
**The fact is that the South Fork dam was both well designed and well built and it did not break or fail of its own – it failed because of the almost three hours of abuse it withstood because the SFF&HC failed to rebuild it to its original sound design and reduced its ability to safely rid itself of excess water.**

6.) p. 13-“They [Cambria Iron Company] had all the material assets required for King’s vision to

 become a reality: iron ore, coal, limestone, clay, land, and transportation.”

-This is not so much a refutation as a suggestion. Water, which was provided in Johnstown via the Conemaugh and Stony Creek Rivers, is the most important material asset in making steel. The following article provides information on this: C. Langdon White, “Water: A Neglected Factor in the Geographical Literature of Iron and Steel.” *Geographical Review* vol. 47, no. 4 (October 1957): 463-489. The following quote is taken from this article:

 “A single blast furnace may use as much water in a day as a city of 30,000 people. Without these millions of gallons of cold water circulating around essential parts of the furnaces, the machinery would soon become inoperative.” (White, p. 469)

-While the importance of water is referenced in steel making toward the end of *The Bosses Club*, it’s done so as an afterthought. The rivers were as much a key reason why Cambria Iron not only set up shop, but stayed here for so many years. One can be sure that where there are steel mills, there are sizable bodies of water very close by.

You’re correct. Steel can’t be made without an abundant source of water. And the Johnstown area is historically known for that resource. **I should have mentioned this; this oversight will be corrected in the next edition and will read:** *“The Cambria Iron Company had all the material assets required for King’s vision to become reality: iron ore, coal, limestone, clay, land, water and transportation.”*

7.) p. 19-“Some of their neighbors weren’t sorry to see the Carnegie’s move away, especially

 that nasty boy Andrew.”

-Despite that fact that it’s not the author’s intention to denigrate Carnegie, as is claimed towards the end of *The Bosses Club*, it seems that is, indeed, one of the objectives this book seeks to accomplish. By using a term like “nasty” here, early in the book and as one of the first references to Carnegie, the author is setting Carnegie up to be the “bad guy.” Rather than labeling, historians establish the facts, then let the audience reach their own conclusions; unless it’s more than obvious that somebody was good or bad. At Johnstown Flood National Memorial, we get many visitors, well versed on Carnegie who think he was great, while still we get visitors who think he was bad. The National Park Service at Johnstown Flood National Memorial does not intend to label the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club and/or its members as “good” or “bad,” but rather present the facts and let the visitors draw their own conclusions. This book seeks to cast Carnegie negatively from the beginning, rather than letting the reader draw their own, educated conclusions.

From pages 44 and 45 of the book *Andrew Carnegie* by Joseph Frazier Wall (University of Pittsburgh Press, Copyright 1970 and 1989, ISBN 0-8229-5904-6) is the following account:

“It was his mother who served as instructor for his understanding of the practical realities of the present. It was
she who handled the family finances, hoarded the precious pennies, and tended the family garden. With a tough resiliency that her husband lacked, she accepted life for what it was, a competitive struggle for existence. Although in sympathy with the Radical causes of her brother and her husband, she expected no millennium on this earth nor any Paradise in the next. She knew that her daily bread would never be given; it had to be bought in the marketplace with money earned by hard labor. All this she taught her son, and Andrew learned his lesson well.”

“On occasion, too well. Andrew never forgot his embarrassment on his first day at school, when the master called on each child to stand up and say a proverb from the Bible. When it came Andrew’s turn, he stood up proudly and repeated from his mother’s personal catechism: “Take care of your pence, the pound will take care of themselves.” Then, in bewildered fright, he took his seat as the master glared and his schoolmates giggled.”

“In time, many of the tasks that Margaret [Andrew’s mother] had had to perform – filling the waterbuckets in the morning, or getting the pirns of linen yarn from the spinning mills – could be delegated to her energetic son. He would proudly march off to the mill, carrying his father’s great stovepipe “lum” hat, and a short time later would as proudly deliver the pirns to his father’s loomshop.”

“The early morning trips to the city wells were not quite so pleasant, however. Public water facilities in Dunfermline were inadequate for the growing population, and there was always keen competition to be at the head of the water-line in the morning. Otherwise there might be an hour’s [sic] wait before one could fill his water cans. Andrew quickly learned that a water-line protocol existed, which he considered unfair: at night the women of the neighborhood would place old buckets in line before the pump to make reservations in the morning line. The boy took his proper place in line for the first several mornings, but when he saw day after day women arriving much later than he and moving far ahead of him in line, his patience gave out. The following morning he simply kicked the waiting buckets aside and walked to the head of the line. His fellow water-bearers scolded at him, but he got his water first. It is small wonder that many of the women of the neighborhood regarded the Carnegie’s boy as “an awfu’ laddie.”

While the Author got the exact quote wrong, he did NOT mischaracterize Carnegie’s character or his behavior.

**The quote will be corrected in the next edition of *The Bosses Club* and an appropriate citation will be provided.**
Additionally, the Author wants to point out that he is NOT a historian nor has he tried to use historian’s methods, and has admitted as much both in *The Bosses Club* as well as numerous other places at various times. Therefore, the Author is not, in this clearly fictional work, trying to behave and write as a historian. The Author is a story teller weaving a story that is an alternate theory about what happened during that era to cause the 1889 Johnstown Flood, and unfortunately, that story is at odds with settled history and the version of that history that the NPS promulgates. However, the Author’s story IS BY NO MEANS a complete fabrication: *The Bosses Club* relies on factual accounts, like the preceding anecdote about Carnegie, to give the Author’s story substance. Yet, the Author is sympathetic to both the Analyst’s and NPS’ concern regarding painting Carnegie as the “bad guy” from the beginning of *The Bosses Club.* However, the Author feels that the NPS is being unfair in their concern: they already sell other fictional works that, for instance, “denigrate” and from the beginning “cast as the bad guy” the post-flood supposedly crazed and incensed citizens of Johnstown and the surrounding area. To the Author’s knowledge there’s no substance to support that Author’s fictional account that Johnstown’s citizens were supposedly crazed and incensed after the flood, while there certainly is abundant evidence, as documented above, to support the Author’s contention that Carnegie wasn’t a very nice guy. The Author DOES NOT WANT the NPS to stop selling the other fictional work, but he DOES WANT his alternate theory and contrary viewpoint (relative to settled history and the NPS’ preferences) to at least be available for purchase at the NPS’ stores.

As mentioned previously, the Author will rephrase this section so that it more accurately matches the account previously cited above, with an accurate quotation and an appropriate citation, however this nugget of history IS IN FACT germane to the story and helps the Author to develop Carnegie’s character for the reader. Certainly, there are many glowing accounts of Carnegie’s largesse and generosity after the 1889 Johnstown Flood, and for that he has been well recognized, but his post-flood largesse and generosity don’t cancel out or negate his almost ruthless quest for money, sometimes at the expense of others and the truth and fairness, while conducting his financial and business affairs in ways that today would land him in jail for SEC and Treasury violations. Nor does his post-flood largesse negate the wake of unintended bad consequences, such as the flood, that trailed behind Carnegie and the other SFF&HC members. There’s a reason why Carnegie, Morgan, Rockefeller and others from that era were called “Robber Barons”. Carnegie wasn’t always a “nice” and “good” guy and it is important that the reader understand that Carnegie had learned early on how to be a “master manipulator”. For instance, on page 45 of the same book, is the following account:

 “The boy also learned that if one cannot always push others aside in order to get what one wants, there
 are other ways to reach the same goal. One day William Carnegie [Andrew’s father] brought home a pair
 of rabbits as a gift for Andrew. Margaret Carnegie [Andrew’s mother] was not so pleased as her young
 son, however, and immediately she raised questions about feeding what inevitably would be a whole
 family of rabbits. She pointed out that they had no greens in their garden to waste. The boy pleaded for
 his pets and was finally granted permission to keep them, providing he would find his own sources for
 their food. When the not unexpected additions to the family occurred, Andrew was ready with their
 provender, for he had promised each boy in the neighborhood that one rabbit would be named after
 him if that boy would feed his namesake. The well-fed rabbits of course remained Andrew’s possessions.
 The education of Andrew Carnegie was progressing well, and much of it was to be self-taught.”

Mark Twain famously wrote about how Tom Sawyer had persuaded his neighborhood compatriots to paint the white picket fence for him. The Author is not sure if that characterizes Tom Sawyer as a “bad guy” but the Author’s absolutely certain it characterizes Tom Sawyer as an opportunist and manipulator. Carnegie was an opportunist and a master manipulator.

8.) p. 23-“…O’Reilly Telegraph…”

-It is, in fact, O’Rielly.

**I stand corrected. I will revise in the next edition.**

9.) pp. 22-24-Using terms like “cheating” and “impudent” to describe Carnegie.

-Present the facts and people will draw their own conclusions.

**See preceding explanation from 7).**

10.) p. 36-“…script…”

-Should be scrip, though this is done correctly through the rest of the book, so this is probably just a typographical error.

**I stand corrected. I will correct this typo in the next edition. Thanks for pointing it out.**

11.) p. 69-“The purchase included the South Fork dam [sic], also known as the Western Reservoir and Lake Conemaugh.”

-The water was not referred to as “Lake Conemaugh” until the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club referred to it as that. This fact is in many sources and exhibits at Johnstown Flood National Memorial.

My intention was to show that it was called by several different names. I should have and will, in the next revision, include an Author’s note identifying that it was referred to by different names and clarify for the reader that the Author will use any or all of the names interchangeably. Sometimes just because a name has been officially changed, the public and officials, who should know better, don’t always use the official name. For example: In 1891 the State referred to it as “The South Fork Reservoir of the Pennsylvania Canal”. Locally, even today, Penelec, for example, has had several name changes just since 2001 and is now back to being officially referred to by its original name: Penelec.
12.) p. 70-Author’s Note…That Andrew Carnegie gave the South Fork Dam many and thorough

 visits and thus became quite knowledgeable of it, once the Pennsylvania Railroad took

 over possession of the state canal system, since Carnegie was the secretary of Thomas

 Scott.

-While it stands to reason that at some point Carnegie visited the dam, he probably did so when he became superintendent of the Pittsburgh Division of the railroad, rather than as Scott’s secretary.

I’m glad you phrased this in the above manner. You seem to be expressing agreement with the possibility that my theory is correct in this area – if not absolutely correct. However, I do want to point out that on pages 174 and 175 in McCullough’s book, *The Johnstown Flood,* he points out:

“Pitcairn’s knowledge of the dam went back more than thirty years, to the time when the Pennsylvania [Railroad] had first bought it [in 1857]. … He knew every bend, bridge, siding, every water tower, coal tipple, every depot, every barn and farmhouse along the horizon. … He was their supreme commander. His word was law from Altoona to Pittsburgh …”

Since Pitcairn was Carnegie’s successor in the role of Superintendent of the Western Division of the Pennsylvania Railroad, the Author believes it would be highly unlikely for Carnegie to not have visited the dam and have known all about it. Carnegie was not your normal secretary with normal secretarial duties, but assumed responsibilities well beyond those of what a normal person thinks of duties of a secretary. If you need citations I will be glad to provide them. I believe he visited the dam not as a tourist but in the capacity and authority of Thomas Scott, but my only proof is that it would have fit his character to a tee during the period he served as Thomas Scott’s secretary.

Various Carnegie biographies indicate that ever since he was young boy, Carnegie wasn’t interested in something unless it could provide a nice paycheck.

Exactly

In the 1860s, the Pennsylvania Railroad was establishing its line and, at the time, the South Fork Dam was a part of the old and dilapidated Pennsylvania Mainline Canal, which was not making money, so the educated guess is that Carnegie probably only gave it a passing glance, focusing more on the “sure thing” of making money through the development of the building of the Pennsylvania Railroad, rather than the dam of a system that was, then, just a memory.

It’s hard to know exactly what Carnegie was thinking. Possibly you’re correct, however Carnegie didn’t own the railroad: he did, however, have an interest in the fledgling Piper and Shiffler Bridge Company (whose successor was the Keystone Bridge Company in 1865). The Piper and Shiffler Bridge Company had no blast furnaces to make iron for their bridges and had to buy either newly poured ingots or melt down iron that had been recycled. I think it’s easy to imagine Carnegie looking out onto this beautiful lake and thinking what an opportunity for developing a beautiful money-making resort. But, he was on the horns of a dilemma because he also needed the iron pipes at the bottom of the breast for his fledgling Piper Shiffler Bridge Company, begun in 1862. The lake would have to go. I had originally estimated forty two tons of iron was just laying there at the bottom of the dam’s breast, waiting to be recycled. I’ve since learned that it was actually about 75 tons of iron and 6 tons of wrought iron. In any case, Carnegie just needed to rescue this iron from this worthless dam. If only he had a cover story for removing the iron pipes at the bottom of the dam’s breast, a lot of iron could be had just by removing it!

So, it was, for Carnegie, a serendipitous coincidence that Johnstown’s leaders expressed their concerns regarding the dam’s integrity during their meeting with the PRR’s attorney representative, Mr. Pershing:

 *"The canal Reservoir is represented by citizens who have visited it recently as in a dangerous condition. A
 portion of the arch[2] in the breast wall has fallen, leaving but a feeble support at that point for the immense
 body of water behind it. Should this dam give way suddenly, as it is likely to do in case of a heavy rain, unless the
 fallen wall is speedily repaired, the consequences would be serious. The matter was brought before the Borough
 Council on Tuesday evening when Mr. Pershing[3] promised to telegraph to the canal authorities apprising them
 of the impending danger." [from The Tribune, Johnstown, PA., July 18, 1862, Vol. V, No. XVI]*
The “canal authorities” Mr. Pershing telegraphed were, of course, his superiors at the Pennsylvania Railroad – including Carnegie (and perhaps ONLY Carnegie).

So, it comes as no great surprise to the Author that coincidentally two weeks later the dam supposedly breaks in a non-violent way:

 *"The Reservoir dam, the precarious condition of which we noticed two weeks ago, gave way on Saturday
 morning last, and emptied its waters into the Conemaugh. The announcement of the breaking of the dam
 caused considerable alarm in town, but owing to the low stage of water in the creek the flow from the Reservoir
 produced but an inconsiderable rise, and the excitement and the flood both soon subsided. No loss or damage
 was sustained by anybody so far as we can learn, except the carrying away of about two hundred dollars worth
 of bridge lumber belonging to Wood, Morrell & Co., which was being floated down the creek, and the over- flowing and washing away of a few rods of the railroad track at South Fork, which detained the morning train
 from the East until late in the afternoon. Many people were badly scared about the breaking of the Reservoir,
 but nobody was hurt by it." [from The Tribune, Johnstown, PA., August 1, 1862, Vol. V, No. XVIII – Local
 Miscellany]*

The dam’s “breaking” caused “an inconsiderable rise” and “nobody was hurt by it”. That sounds like the “immense body of water behind” the dam’s supposedly “dangerous” and “feeble” breast caused only minimal damage after slightly raising the river’s water level.

How could that be, unless instead of “breaking”, as represented in the second news story, the dam’s sluice pipes had instead been opened to drain the dam, causing the downstream water to rise in the river? In point of fact, the dam did not “break” the same way it did in 1889 and rather was most likely rapidly drained via the sluice pipes, causing the water to rise downstream. Then, to cover the removal of the sluice pipes after the dam was drained, the PRR, which Carnegie controlled in the Johnstown area, represented that the dam had broken, thus providing the perfect excuse for damaging the dam’s breast by removing the sluice pipes!

In Somerset County they just relocated an 1871 vintage railroad bridge onto the bike trail. It weighed 45 tons. Certainly, the substantial quantity of iron at the bottom of the dam’s breast – 75 tons was enough for almost two iron bridges – was ripe for the picking while Carnegie controlled the PRR’s Western Division and would be of substantial financial help to Carnegie’s fledgling Piper and Shiffler Bridge Company.

**Does the Analyst doubt Carnegie would have been so motivated? My theory is certainly plausible, given Carnegie’s rapacious quest for money.**

13.) p. 71-“Carnegie, now in Scott’s position as superintendent of the Western Line supervised

 all aspects of the railroad. His duties would often take him to the Conemaugh Yards

 in Johnstown where he had a lot of time to admire the Cambria Iron Works.”

-Does the author have proof of the assertion that Carnegie was interested in the Cambria Iron Works?

Your characterization and the phrasing of your question are combative and not germane to what the Author wrote.

It would be human nature for any train passenger to admire an industrial work that was then one of the largest in the USA and the world while traveling through Johnstown on the Pennsylvania Railroad enroute to or from Pittsburgh!

However, when Carnegie decided to build the Edgar Thompson works [so named after Carnegie’s PRR boss to ensure that the PRR remained one of Carnegie’s largest customers – remember the story about Carnegie’s rabbits?] he sent Tom Carnegie’s father-in-law, William Coleman, to Johnstown in 1871 for an extensive tour of the Cambria Iron Company, William Coleman was a business partner with Carnegie in Carnegie’s new Braddock mill. If this is not proof I don’t know what would convince you.

Perhaps you’d be happier if the Author included an Author’s NOTE on the same page clarifying that this is something suspected by the Author but neither conclusively proven nor disproven, while changing the preceding to:

“Carnegie, now in Scott’s position as superintendent of the Western Line, supervised all aspects of the railroad. His duties often took him to and through the Conemaugh Yards in Johnstown, where he had a lot of time to admire the Cambria Iron Works, then one of the largest industrial works in the United States and the World.” [suggested changes are underlined]

-At this point, the analyst is up to page 71 of *The Bosses Club* and one concern is apparent. This book seems to go into and out of fiction and nonfiction. In the Disclaimer on p. xii, the author states, “This is a work of fiction…” However, it is obvious to this analyst that some sections are meant to establish fact, and some are meant to be fiction. The fear is that a layperson to the Johnstown Flood story will not know what sections are meant to be fact and which sections are meant to be fiction. Based on the discussions we have had with park visitors who have read the book, the major assumption is that the book is meant to be fact. At the very least there needs to be some sort of “Author’s Note” to distinguish between the two. For the areas of the book that are in question, it is not ok for the author to say that it was meant to be fiction and that be ok. For an example, here is my next point. Is the information in point 15, meant to be fact or fiction, because according to the historical record, it is fiction.

I understand and appreciate your concern – it is not my desire to be misleading! The Author will, in the next edition of *The Bosses Club,* try to address your concerns by identifying which sections are fact and which are fiction through better citations, annotations and Author’s Notes.

14.) p. 77-“Employment at Cambria [this is in a section dated 1859-1861] had now reached

 1,948 men, and it was understood by all in the industry that Cambria’s was the largest

 iron company in the entire United States.”

-According to Sharon A. Brown, *Historic Resource Study: Cambria Iron Company,* it was not until the mid-1870s that Cambria earned the title of the largest iron and steel works (p. 48). She goes on to state the before the Civil War Cambria and Brady’s Bend Iron Works produced 1/7 of the 150,000 tons of steel made in America. Brown got that information from the following sources: John William Bennett, “Iron Workers in the Woods Run and Johnstown: The Union Era, 1865-1895,” Ph.D. Disseration, University of Pittsburgh, 1977; Cambria Iron Company, *Centennial Exhibition*, 1876, p. 8; Engineering “History,” p. 3; Pearse, *Concise History,* pp. 172-173; Swank, “Manufacture,” George W. Hughes, “The Pioneer Iron Industry in Western Pennsylvania,” *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine* 14 (1931): 216.

Which iron company was larger during the 1859-1861 period? Where is the proof? Would the Analyst and NPS be satisfied if the wording were changed to the following, along with an Author’s NOTE on the same page:

“Employment at Cambria [this is in a section dated 1859-1861] had now reached 1,948 men, and it was understood by all in the industry that Cambria Iron was the one of the largest if not the largest iron companies in the entire United States.”

Author’s NOTE: the Author believes that Cambria Iron Company had by the late 1850s and early 1860s become the largest iron company in the United States, but he does not have irrefutable proof to that effect. Certainly the Cambria Iron company had by the late 1850s and early 1860s had become one of the largest iron companies in the United States.

**Would the preceding wording change and Author’s NOTE clarify this to the Analyst’s and NPS’ satisfaction?**

15.) p. 84-“Berkley Springs”

-Berkeley Springs, WV.

**This is a typo. I’ll correct this in the next edition of *The Bosses Club****,* however it wasn’t until the civil war that the western part of Virginia broke away and declared themselves to be West Virginia and became a state on June 20, 1863.

16.) p. 85-Author’s Note: Assertion that the South Fork Dam was not in poor condition

 between 1857-1862, as is always stated in flood history and that perhaps the

 Pennsylvania Railroad was somehow involved in the 1862 break of the dam.

 p. 86-“Henry’s father concluded, ‘I don’t know what these people are talking about

 because as many times as I’ve been up there, I’ve never seen a leak in the dam. It was

 perfectly made and cost the state of Pennsylvania $167,000 to build. Now they’ve

 ruined it! It is empty and they burnt down the control tower that was used to open and

 close the valves that left water out for the canal. I guess the next thing they’ll do is

 take the drain pipes away for scrap. Such a beautiful structure to be ruined is so sad.”

-Historic documentation shows that, in fact, the South Fork Dam was flawed almost from the beginning. Any assertion that the dam was well built is fiction.

You are completely and categorically wrong on this. Concluding otherwise is a denial of the overwhelming evidence previously provided which confirms that the dam was originally both well built and well designed and included two spillways. See the previous citations.

-The following is from Harlan D. Unrau, “In 1847 the partially-completed South Fork Dam, which was described as ‘continually wasting away,’ broke, causing a minor flood in Johnstown. According to one account, the water ‘was from four to six feet high on the ‘Island’ and the lower parts of the city. The waste weir from the Basin and the overhead bridge from Canal Street to Portage Street, were destroyed. A short distance below where is now located the Baltimore & Ohio Station, the northerly bank of the Canal was washed out for a distance of a hundred feet. Boats which were in the Basin were washed through the break and carried away, passing under the aqueduct, and one of them knocked off the corner of Gaffer Davis’ brick house on ‘Goose Island.’ (Unrau, p. 41) Unrau’s source is: Henry Wilson Storey, *History of Cambria County, Pennsylvania*, (3 vols., New York, 1907), 314.

It is true that there were problems caused by the interruption during construction of the dam and while it was being built over the many years it took. I would imagine that would be the case for most earthen dams if construction was stoped midcourse for many years. Describing the effects of flooding in Johnstown caused while the dam was partially-completed hardly proves that the dam was flawed. The State was responsible for building it and they employed engineers to build a well-designed reservoir using then available techniques, materials and equipment. Most projects from that time period were so over engineered and over built that they could still be in use today – and some are. For instance, the Brooklyn Bridge was built with flaws but still supports traffic today, flaws and all.

As stated by the Johnstown Area Heritage Association paper in 2013, Secondary source, History of the Dam, States “The wall of the reservoir, as originally planned and built, was well made and safe.”

-The following is the timeline of the construction of the South Fork Dam. Knowing what happened here is important to knowing the full story of what happened on May 31, 1889:

1834-1835-Engineer Sylvester Welch was given the job of locating the right spot for the

 Western Reservoir.

February 18, 1836-Based on Welch’s findings, the Pennsylvania State Legislature passed an act

 for the construction of the South Fork Dam.

Also referred to as The South Fork Reservoir of the Pennsylvania Canal

1839-William Morris, a second state engineer, was given the job of finally locating a spot for the

 dam so that construction at long last could commence; he chose the same spot that Welch

 Welch had selected in 1834-1835.

Exactly and they both made a good decision. The South Fork site was the only one that met the engineer’s requirements.

April 1840-end of 1841-Work began on the South Fork Dam but state appropriations fell through

 at the end of 1841.

1842-1851-Very minor work done at the South Fork site, sat mostly uncompleted and untouched.

 Work stoppage was because of the lapse of appropriations and a feared cholera

 epidemic.

This would hardly affect the quality of the construction work or the engineering. Work could be restarted with only a slight amount of additional work. For instance, the safety of a highway is unaffected when it’s partially completed sections are connected many years later. For example, US Route 219 is currently being built from Somerset to Meyersdale, connecting the previously completed section Meyersdale section to the section ending in Somerset.

June 1852-The damming of the Western Reservoir began.

On June 10, 1852 to be exact.

1853-The dam was ready for operation. (This timeline information is found in many works, but especially the Harlan D. Unrau, *Historic Resource Study: The South Fork Dam*)

-When the *Engineering News and Railway Journal* came to investigate the South Fork Dam in the wake of the flood in 1889, they took serious issue with the fact that there was a lengthy delay in the completion of the dam from 1842-1851. The portion that had been constructed up to 1842, would have been left to settle and sag and, in 1852, there would have been a terribly weak spot where the old portion was connected to the new. There (sic) conclusion was that the old portion should have been torn down and started all over again because of the dangerous weakness that would have been present where the old and the new met.

The examination conducted immediately after the 1889 Johnstown Flood examined the dam as it had been poorly rebuilt by the SFF&HC members, which was not how it had been originally designed or originally constructed. The Author has never found anything remotely resembling the Analyst’s above assertions from the Unrau account which referenced the *Engineering News and Railway Journal’s* account. Please provide a citation for your assertions that “… there would have been a terribly weak spot where the old portion was connected to the new…” and “… that the old portion should have been torn down and started all over again because of the dangerous weakness that would have been present where the old and the new met”. I’ve found nothing to support these assertions! Accordingly, the Author disagrees with the Analyst’s apparently unsupported assertions that there had to have been a “terribly weak spot where the old portion was connected to the new” – this is a conclusion unsupported, as best I can determine, by the reference from which it was supposedly extracted – please provide a citation! Certainly there would have been a weak spot where the old and the new connected ONLY if the new portion was not compacted sufficiently as the old at the time of the new portion’s construction. In fact, in Unrau on page 116 the following is recounted from the *Engineering News and Railway Journal’s* report:

*“… the new work was comparatively carelessly and loosely built. It would, therefore, settle while the old part did not, and its settlement would not be noticed …”*

The Author can understand how the portion repaired by the SFF&HC (sometimes referred to as the “new work”) would not have been sufficiently compacted as was the older, original construction. The material borrowed from the top of the breast when the SFF&HC repaired it wasn’t appropriate for the wet side of the dam where they were dumping it without further compaction. But, that’s an indictment of the dam’s reconstruction – not its original design and original construction. In fact, any settling of the original construction would have made the dam stronger, not weaker! Never-the-less, the dam did not break because of an inherent weak spot in the dam’s breast, it broke because water rushing over the central part of the breast washed away the dry side of the dam, thus weakening it to the point that it broke.

-With the dam being sliced away as it was, a nice cross-section of the interior of the dam was exposed. The Engineering News examined this and found the interior rock to be rotten. When they went and found the “borrowing pits” where the original rock was quarried, the rock there was rotten also. The Engineering News also concluded, “As to the earth in the rammed benches, we should judge it to be fairly good puddling material, but hardly of the best class, not being quite clayey [sic] enough.”

(“The South Fork Dam and Johnstown Disaster.” *Engineering News and American Railway Journal* 21 (January-June 1889): 540-545.)

They were examining the dam as rebuilt by the SFF&HC, which had, as explained by Frank, Unrau, and Katkins and company, used substandard material to rebuild the dam. So naturally they found flaws in the material used to rebuild the dam. That DOES NOT mean that the original dam had been built using substandard material. To so conclude is to ignore the excellent forensic engineering work done by Katkins and company and Frank. And the reference to the borrowing pits, where the rock was quarried, was, I believe, a reference to the source for the material used in the dam’s reconstruction – not a reference to the source for the material used in the dam’s original construction.

But, even if the “earth in the rammed benches” was “hardly of the best class” and not “quite clayey [sic] enough”, those flaws were not the cause of the dam’s failure: water going over the top of the earthen dam and running down its dry side is what caused the dam to fail. The South Fork dam could have survived to this day with all of its flaws, just like the Brooklyn Bridge and other structures (cf. the Pyramids in Egypt), if water hadn’t been allowed to run over the top of the breast and down its dry side!

Wellington and Burt, the two engineers who examined the dam for the *Engineering News and American Railway Journal,* were quoted by Unrau as writing that:

 *“… the disaster might have been greatly alleviated, but still hardly avoided …” [p. 116 Unrau]

“It is impossible to say if the riprapping of the new part of the dam was as good as the old or not, since it has not been wholly carried away. A large amount of the old riprapping and slope wall still remains intact and is of excellent quality. It does not appear that there was any great amount of leakage through the dam before it broke. The destruction came from water flowing over the top.” [p. 112 Unrau]*

The fact is that the SFF&HC members didn’t properly rebuild the dam to its original design by reinstalling the sluice pipes, lowered the breast of the dam – thereby making the secondary spillway completely ineffective – and valued fish more than the dam’s integrity by refusing to remove the fish screens at the primary spillway which would have helped to slow the dam’s fateful and catastrophic rise.

-Of the 1862 failure of the South Fork Dam, Harlan Unrau explains, “The problem at the culvert apparently was the result of slipshod construction and the lack of maintenance repairs. Later, the *Johnstown Daily Tribune* reported that: ‘…It is said the specifications (for the dam) called for three puddle walls five feet thick, in ditches from which all the soil was to have been removed. This was not done, and the stone-arched culvert through which ran the pipes to let out the water was laid on ‘sheet-piling’ on a boggy ground, with a consequence that there was always a leak in the dam [Emphasis Added]. (Unrau, p. 53) Unrau’s source was (*Johnstown Daily Tribune*, August 10, 1900.)

The Analyst is reciting Urau’s account and conclusion as if they were facts reached by Unrau after his own forensic engineering examination of the failed dam: as if Unrau were the engineering expert – or, as if Urau had written his account and reached his conclusion based on expert’s forensic engineering examination of the failed dam. As best the Author can determine neither case is true. Unrau’s assertions are not supported by any facts or citations from experts but are simply his own theories. While it’s fine for the NPS to have their own theories about what happened, please don’t criticize the Author for doing the same and then use the NPS’ theories as fact.

With regard to the account referred to from the *Johnstown Daily Tribune,* again, that’s a conclusion apparently promoted by the *Tribune* in their story with no apparent engineering support for their conclusion. While it’s true that many accounts say that there was a leak in the dam, the accounts provided in Urau apparently are that the continuous leakage from the dam came from the pipe culvert and no where else. [p 115 Unrau]

-The assertion in *The Bosses Club* is that the Pennsylvania Railroad intentionally let out the water of the South Fork Dam in 1862. The only real property damage that came from the failure of the dam in 1862 was to the Pennsylvania Railroad at South Fork. While there is no documentation, it seems unlikely that the Pennsylvania Railroad wouldn’t have taken the potential for damage into consideration if, in fact, they were going to somehow let water out of the dam.

Carnegie was the Pennsylvania Railroad at that time. I guess it was possible for him to make a mistake or purposely claim damage so that no one would suspect anything. However, it is not true that “the only real property damage … was to the PRR at South Fork”. The second Tribune story about the supposed 1862 dam break documented that the Cambria Iron Company also had a loss. I think it was also likely that the PRR managers, like Carnegie, would have been risk averse given the city’s documented concerns for the dam’s integrity and therefore chose to quickly drain the dam: after all, the alleged “dam break” occurred about two weeks after the City’s Fathers had met with the PRR attorney representative. I could imagine him sending a telegram to his client, the PRR, informing them that the City’s Fathers were concerned about the possibility of a catastrophic failure. No pictures of the dam from 1862 are available. Just two small articles appeared in the Tribune about two weeks apart. The fact that no attempt was made to repair the dam after it was drained proves that the railroad had no use for the dam. In fact, it was a liability for the railroad to keep it full. **What better excuse could you come up with to drain it empty?**

17.) pp. 99-100-The Freedom Iron Co. had no blast furnaces, but would make rails from pig iron

 they purchased from Cambria and others, or recycled iron from scrap they

 scrounged up (like, possibly the cast iron drain pipes removed from the

 Conemaugh Reservoir). After the war, Freedom’s best customers came from the

 South during the Reconstruction Period [sic].

-At best, this is out of place-especially since footnote 20 mentions “Reilly”-up to this point in the story, who the heck is Reilly?

I agree that I do not need to introduce Reilly to the reader during my discussion of the Freedom Iron Company. This is better suited for a different place in *The Bosses Club*. Therefore, I’ll, in the next edition of *The Bosses Club*, remove the words “(like, possibly the cast iron drain pipes removed from the Conemaugh Reservoir)” and footnote 20.

 **I’ve had difficulty researching the Freedom Iron. Does the National Park Service have information on Freedom Iron?**

-At worst, this is suggesting something at the wrong time.

-Freedom Iron, an Andrew Carnegie venture, was founded in 1861, and the South Fork Dam was still in use in 1862. In fact, the section of the canal from Johnstown to Blairsville was not closed until 1863.

-The Reilly mentioned in Footnote 20 is most-likely John Reilly, Agreed who does not come into the picture until 1875, so to suggest he had something to do with the removal of the pipes in the early 1860s, as this footnote seems to attempt to do, is just plain wrong. This will be changed in the next edition of *The Bosses Club* These facts are all contained in various sources, but especially (Harlan D. Unrau, *Historic Structure Report: The South Fork Dam*).

-To this analyst, this appears to be one of those roller-coasters into and out of fiction mentioned above. It seems that it is the author’s goal to suggest and posit that, even though there is no documentation to verify it, the removal of the pipes was done in some way to benefit Andrew Carnegie, so therefore there was some nefarious end involved.

So does the National Park Service have documentation proving exactly when the pipes were removed, by whom, how they were removed and where they went? When was the control tower burnt down? If not, why are you objecting to the Author’s plausible theory when there’s no documentation to either prove or disprove the Author’s plausible theory? The Author has agreed, in a subsequent revision, to document where he is speculating.

18.) p. 102-“But *I* believe…” [various other examples in the book]

-Just a writing tip, that an author really should not refer to themselves in the first person in their work. If an author definitely has to refer to themselves, the best way to approach it is something along the lines of: “This author believes…” The work is the author’s and most people realize that so reference to themselves should be at a bare minimum. Even better is something along the lines of: “The research indicates…” “The facts indicate…”

Criticism welcomed and, where humanly possible, the Author will incorporate these suggestions into the next edition of *The Bosses Club.*

19.) p. 121-“Lake Conemaugh.”

-Again, the name “Lake Conemaugh,” did not come until the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club era.

This will be corrected in the next edition.

20.) p. 143-Footnote 29. That Johnstown, not Pittsburgh, should get credit for the first integrated

 steel mill in the country.

-The analyst agrees wholeheartedly with the information contained in Footnote 29. May the analyst suggest including a reference to one of the “popular history accounts,” to show how this is true.

While I agree with you, I’m not sure why I’d need to incorporate a “popular history account” to demonstrate that it’s the commonly accepted belief that Pittsburgh and Carnegie deserve credit for the first integrated mill since there are numerous accounts which already incorrectly assert this.

However, in the interest of incorporating your suggestion so that *The Bosses Club* can be sold in NPS stores, could you please suggest a suitable “popular history account” that the Author could cite as an example of this in the next edition? **Would the History Channel documentary “*The men who built America”* be suitable?**

21.) p. 159-“My grandpa suspected that the drain pipes from the dam were recycled into

 Carnegie’s Keystone Bridge beams.” Footnote 34

-Despite the fact that on page 159 we are not quite to the years when John Reilly was involved and the drain pipes taken away, this sentence and the footnote are great examples. The word “suspected” is great! It was a wholehearted belief, but the potential is also present that perhaps it is not true. Footnote 34 is great. A historian couldn’t ask for more.

Wow! The Author is pleased that this was acceptable to the NPS Analyst and will try to use this type of citation and footnote in the next edition of *The Bosses Club.*

22.) p. 163-Interestingly, the stones [of the Franklin Street Church] that were used to face the

 building were reclaimed sleeper ties from the old Pennsylvania Canal’s Allegheny

 Portage Railroad.

-Sleepers may have been used, but according to the church’s own history <http://www.franklinstreetchurch.com/History.html>, a majority of the stones came from the dismantling of old canal locks.

This will be revised in the next edition of *The Bosses Club.*

23.) p. 170-The discussion of Johnstown v. Ebensburg as the Cambria County Seat.

-This was settled in 1804. As this is in a chapter with the years 1867-1871, it is in the wrong spot. This information is detailed in chapters 1 and 2 of:

 (Shappee, Nathan D. “A History of Johnstown and the Great Flood of 1889: A Study of Disaster

 and Rehabilitation.” Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1940.)

-This is not the only time in *The Bosses Club*, where something is mentioned in the wrong time frame, which is particularly troubling.

Please see the prior explanation for 4)

24.) pp. 189-194-The discussion of Capt. Bill Jones leaving Cambria Iron Company.

-I believe the story, as presented in *The Bosses Club* to be factually incorrect.

-According to *The Bosses Club* Carnegie came in, dangled a carrot in front of Captain Jones’ eye, Jones left Cambria, and this shocked Morrell. According to Sharon A. Brown, Morrell and Jones ruffled each other’s feathers and Jones could not fathom staying longer. Carnegie came in at the right time and Morrell was all too happy to see Jones leave, especially since Jones did not fall in lockstep with management. “Morrell believed in paying the lowest possible wages, a policy with which George Fritz and William R. Jones disagreed. As a result, after Fritz died in 1873, Cambria’s directors, influenced by Morrell, refused to promote Jones to Fritz’s position, choosing Daniel Jones instead. Not only did Bill Jones disagree with Morrell’s wage policy, but he was in Morrell’s disfavor for his unorthodox treatment of his workers. He spurred more work from his men than could other supervisor’s, but he did so by shutting down his department to take the men to baseball games or the horse races.”

 (U.S. Department of the Interior. National Park Service. *Historic Resource Study: Cambria Iron*

 *Company* (September 1989), by Sharon A. Brown. 1989, pp. 87)

Brown’s sources are: (Jeanne McHugh, Alexander Holley and the Makers of Steel, p. 252) and (Cochran, *Pennsylvania,* p. 151)

-Brown went on to say, “Bill Jones and Daniel Jones were friends and long-time coworkers, and Daniel Jones’ promotion was embarrassing to both men. Believing his friend deserved the job, Daniel Jones offered to refuse it, but Bill Jones decided to look elsewhere for employment. He did not have to look far, as he found work at the new Carnegie works at Braddock. Labor problems emerged at Cambria and Daniel Morrell offered his workers a choice: either end the difficulties or lose their jobs. Around 200 workers decided to quit, and left Cambria for Braddock to work with the famed Captain Bill Jones.” (Brown, pp. 87-88)

Brown’s sources are: (Jeanne McHugh, Alexander Holley and the Makers of Steel, p. 252) and (Cochran, *Pennsylvania,* p. 151)

-Jones was already looking for work elsewhere at the same time that Carnegie came a calling. Carnegie did not seduce Jones away from Cambria and Jones did not leave without warning or provocation.

That’s what makes history so interesting and like they say, the winners get to write it. I suspect that Alexander Holley may have had something to do with getting Jones to leave Cambria also. He just built his best converters and most modern mill to date, the Edgar Thomson works in Braddock and he knew that Carnegie needed someone good to run it. Cambria had built their converter relying more on George Fritz to build it instead of Holley. A little competitive jealousy perhaps? Remember historians “insist on making it antiseptic, moralistic, sensible.” “Humans are much complicated than that.”

*From William Kelly, A true History of the so-called Bessemer process, by John N. Boucher,*

*Page 176*

*Many have written of Mr. Carnegie’s ability to select the most competent men to put at the head of each division of his works. This was, indeed, one of the many great elements of his success. He selected Captain William R. Jones as manager of the new works, which were located at Braddock, Pennsylvania, and which were named the Edgar Thomson Steel Works, Named after the President of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Carnegie in his account of these achievements, take very little credit for this work, but attributes the success very largely to the superintendent, William R. Jones, to whom he, by the way soon paid a larger salary than the President of the United States received. There is but little doubt that Mr. Jones was the most successful steel-rail-mill superintendent we have had in this country. Unfortunately, in 1889, he was killed at the age of 50, by the bursting of a furnace.*

*Page 76*

*Alexander Holley drew all the plans for which most of the Bessemer works were built. Holley designed six, consulted on three more constructions, and was the inspiration for two more which were copied from one of the first six. The five top engineers met often to discuss problems. These were : Holley; John Fritz, formerly of Cambria and then of
Bethlehem Iron Company; George Fritz of Cambria; Capt. Robert W. Hunt, formerly of Cambria and then manager of the Troy works; and Capt. William Jones, formerly of Cambria and manager of Carnegie’s Edgar Thomson works. Holley also wrote a series of technical reports on the industry for the use of this group, and it was he who was the greatest influence in establishing a communications network in the early Bessemer steel industry.*

*Page 83*

*In 1870 Alexander Holley designed Cambria Iron Company’s Bessemer plant and George Fritz was ordered to proceed with the construction.*

*Page 84*

*George Fritz’s two new features in the blooming mill, that of the driven rollers in the tables and the hydraulic pusher for turning over and moving the ingots were different from those at Alexander Holley’s operation at Troy. The number of men required to operate the mill was reduced from eight to four – three men and a boy. The mill’s design became the standard for American Bessemer works.*

*Page 87*

*Bill Jones decided to look elsewhere for employment. He did not have to look far, as he found work at the new Carnegie works at Braddock. Labor problem emerged at Cambria and Daniel Morrell offered his workers a choice: either end the difficulties or lose their jobs. Around 200 workers decided to quit, and left Cambria for Braddock to work for the famed Captain Bill Jones.*

*Andrew Carnegie* by Joseph Frazer Wall

*Page 358*

*The only apparent victor in the struggle was Bill Jones. The fact that Shinn had threatened to take Jones away from E.T. made Carnegie realize as never before how dependent he was upon the services of the Welsh steelmaker. In characteristic fashion, Jones laid his case openly before Carnegie.*

*I am now in the full vigor of manhood and giving to this company all the brains I possess, backed up with all the energy I have. On my present salary, I can never expect to accumulate a competency for myself or family … I want you to clearly understand that I wish to be connected with no other concern but the E.T. Your Brother, T.C., suits me exactly, and is far more sagacious business man than the late Gen. Man. It is a pleasure to me to be associated with him … and I only give utterance to my earnest convictions when I say of him that he is the clearest brained business man I ever had connections with.*

*Carnegie wasted no time in quibbling over terms. “I like yours of 5th much, - always be frank with us ,,, Tom & I appreciate you I believe more than you do yourself. All you have to do is say what you want & don’t put it low either … Tell me confidentially what would not only satisfy you – but gratify you as well.”*

*Carnegie would have preferred to have made Jones a partner, but the Captain wanted instead a “hell of a big salary.” Replying to Carnegie’s request to name his own figure, Jones answered that the general manager at Bethlehem got $20,000 a year. “I am egoist enough to say that I can walk right around him on all points connected with a work of this kind.” The Jones added hastily, “After re-reading this letter, I find that it would leave the impression in your mind that I think $15,000 would be right. I will say this, I will be satisfied with less.” He got more. Carnegie, making the one big exception to his policy on salaries for top managerial posts, decreed that hereafter Jones’s salary would be $25,000 – the same as that of the President of the United States. Jones accepted with a whoop of Joy. “We will lather the very devil out of (Cambria) in 1881. Give us the material is all we ask. You let little Tom attend to this and look out for 1881. Maybe you would like to bet on 1881. If so, name your bet.” Carnegie lost his “bet” and won the race. For the first four months of 1881, Cambria produced 34,443 tons of rails, E.T., 42,071 tons.*

I contend that when an employee leaves one company for a competitor you don’t necessary get the full story. It usually sounds similar to the reasons given by Capt. Jones “my boss was a jerk”. It seldom is the truth that the competitor lured him away with a better compensation package.

25.) pp. 196-197-These pages set up the idea that perhaps Andrew Carnegie had some sort of

 role in the 1889 flood, in the name of putting the hurt on Cambria Iron in order

 to profit his steel mills.

-Though this may be a “revised” issue of *The Bosses Club*, the conspiracy theory language, -that the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club, especially its member Andrew Carnegie somehow sabotaged the South Fork Dam so that it would intentionally fail and ruin the Cambria Iron Works-is still present. Fiction or not, these are some pretty serious statements and, in light of the fact that the book seems to, as stated above, go into and out of fiction, this is the chief reason why the National Park Service should not be selling this book; the way this book is written makes it easy for the lay person to get confused and think they may be reading factual statements. The author is asking the NPS essentially to stand behind that statement. More will be said about this later, when the meat of the theory is exposed.

I don’t believe anyone planned or wanted a catastrophic flood. But I do believe that poor decisions were intentionally made by those in charge of the SFF&HC, flagrantly ignoring common sense. There are even accounts that document that those SFF&HC leaders who made those poor decisions didn’t care if there was a dam break or not since their perspective was that a “flood” would cause the waters to rise by only a few feet! They were more worried about the fish they might lose than the possibility that the dam might break and flood and decimate Johnstown. The SFF&HC club members couldn’t have done much more to the dam to cause it to fail unless they used dynamite to destroy it! After the flood, there wasn’t a trial and affidavits weren’t taken under oath pursuant to a court proceeding or ever challenged through cross examination; and, the affidavits that were taken were more to protect the SFF&HC members than to get to the truth. Your stores sell books that represent Johnstowners as almost insane with hate, alleging that they sneek into Pittsburgh to burn it down and that they inflict crime and abuse upon SFF&HC members. Other books that have the NPS’ endorsement include numerous mistakes and errors and describe Johnstown, Cambria Iron and Daniel Morrell in less than flattering terms.

26.) p. 211-Footnote 46-“…Accepted history has given Henry Clay Frick credit as one of the

 founding members of the S.F.F. & H. Club, along with Benjamin Ruff.

 Some accounts even say they were co-owners, but with almost all

 records lost, it’s hard to know exactly what happened and who owned

 what.” The insinuation is made that Andrew Carnegie, not Henry Clay

 Frick had a major role in the founding and development of the club.

I did not specifically mention Andrew Carnegie! Please review the answers and citations provided in answer to 7). Certainly, it is fact that Carnegie often was an “invisible hand” in many endeavors. And, he often acted through surrogates in whose name was held the recorded financial interest in the enterprise, even though Carnegie had actually put up the money and later recouped his investment and his interest (an interesting technique that insulated him from liability if the enterprise failed and allowed him to later recoup his investment and his interest should the enterprise be a success). Carnegie was also a master manipulator.

-Historians and researchers do in fact know “what happened and who owned what,” and we have no further to look than the club charter. H. C. Frick’s name is listed as one of the 16 charter and founding members of the club. Frick bought six shares of stock for $600, putting him in “second place” among the stockholders. One name that does not appear on the Charter of the Club is that of Andrew Carnegie.

There is abundant proof that Carnegie and many others including Thomas Scott, Henry Phipps and J. Edgar Thompson financially acted through surrogates and the surrogates’ public representation of their ownership did not always match the reality that they were surreptitiously maintaining the fiction that the surrogate was the owner, despite the fact that the surrogates money came from the principle for whom the surrogate was holding the principle’s interest. So, I wouldn’t rely entirely on what was fed to the public.

PROOF that you don’t know exactly what took place at the SFF&HC is the story that appeared in the Saturday June 18, 2016 edition of the Tribune-Democrat “For years , it’s been the National Park services’s task to tell their stories, even if it sometimes had to rely on as much folklore as fact to do so.” You will have to admit you don’t know much about this place and period in time. Much is yet to be uncovered.

-While we do not know for sure, based on other examples it was probably through Frick that Carnegie was told of the Club, not the other way around.

And maybe not? We know for certain that Andrew Carnegie knew all about the dam. This cannot be denied. But just how did Frick become so familiar with this remote dry lake bed? Do you have proof of your claim that “it was probably through Frick that Carnegie was told of the Club, not the other way around”?

-For instance, Andrew Mellon became a member of the Club because Frick suggested it to him. This information is contained in (Cannadine, David. *Mellon: An American Life.* New York: Random House, 2006.)

-*The Bosses Club*, makes the common mistake that because Andrew Carnegie was a member, he must have been a main player in the Club. However, the existing historical evidence counters this notion. Carnegie joined the Club well late. No evidence exists to prove Carnegie ever set foot on the club property, but rather just joined to keep his name circulating among these wealthy Pittsburghers. He was largely an absentee member. Carnegies name never appears among the Club officers.

There is NO historical evidence either supporting the notion that Carnegie visited and “set foot on the club property” or that he didn’t. You’re speculating both that Carnegie joined just “to keep his name circulating among these wealthy Pittsburghers” and that “he was largely an absentee member”. Asserting that Carnegie’s name doesn’t appear among the Club’s officers doesn’t mean that Carnegie couldn’t have had an influence on the club’s leadership and membership even though he wasn’t an officer. And, in any case, does any of this reduce the member’s crime, shared by all club members including Andrew Carnegie?

The Club Charter indicates the names of the club officers and directors. In article seven of the Club Charter, it states:

“The number of the Directors shall be five and their names and residences for the first year are: C.C. Hussey, Pittsburgh; W.S. Dunn, Pittsburgh; C.A. Carpenter, Pittsburgh; Howard Hartley, Pittsburgh; W.F. Fundenburg, Pittsburgh.”

-Article eight of the Club Charter states: “The officers of this association selected for the first year with their residences are as follows, President B.F. Ruff, Pittsburgh; Secreatary E.A. Meyers, Pittsburgh; Treasurer, E.L. McClintock, who are to serve until the next annual election.”

-The following list is of the Club officers for 1889:

a. President-Colonel Elias J. Unger.

b. Vice President-J.J. Lawrence.

c. Treasurer-Louis Irwin.

d. Secretary-E.A. Myers.

-No record exists of Andrew Carnegie exercising any type of leadership role at the Club.

History is usually about money, motive and application of influence. Carnegie masterfully exerted influence in excess of his position. I began my book wanting to tell the Cambria Iron story but as I researched this and created a time line, I became suspicious of the “conventional” historical accounts about that era: I found that no one was connecting the dots and pulling the story together. How can David McCullough tell the Johnstown Flood story and only start his story the day before the flood?

27). p. 223-Footnote 48. The text attached to this footnote states that Carnegie suggested the

 Club to its members. The footnote states that the lake was full when

 Carnegie was Superintendent of the Western Division of the

 Pennsylvania Railroad.

-There are a lot of problems with the text, both attached to and contained within footnote 48. We do know, however, that the lake was, in fact, not full when Carnegie was Superintendent of the Pittsburgh Division. This information is contained within point 16 above.

You seem to be referring to Footnote 48 on page 221. The facts speak for themselves:
Foot note 48:This conjecture by the author, but this property is in a remote valley 70 miles from Pittsburgh and out of sight of the railroad. Even after getting off the railroad at the South Fork station, a person had to travel two miles on a dirt road to get a view of this empty lake bed. The lake was full when Carnegie was Superintendent of the Western Division of the PRR.

1) The State of Pennsylvania sold the Mainline Canal assets to the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1857, including the South Fork Dam; (Western Reservoir)
2) Carnegie was promoted to Superintendent of the Western Division of the PRR in 1859;
3) The dam was emptied in 1862: therefore, it contained water then. When Carnegie looked out on the lake he could certainly visualize a beautiful resort. Not so for Frick because the lake was an empty basin and by then brush would have covered the mud covered bottom. Not a very pretty site.

If you are complaining about the amount of water in the lake when Carnegie observed it.
You represent that its water was emptied via “a dam break”, mostly based – it seems – on the accounts from the Johnstown Tribune; I, on the other hand, contend based on those same accounts that the dam couldn’t have broken in the same way that it did in 1889: a violent bursting that catastrophically destroyed the town below. I contend that in 1862 the dam was rapidly drained via the sluice pipes at the bottom of its breast. Shappee, in his 1940 Ph.D. issertation, on page 212 asserts that;

*“At the time the [1862] break occurred, there was only a depth of forty-five feet of water in the reservoir.”*

Yet, he also writes without citation for his source that

*“On July 26, 1862, after a heavy rain, the stone culvert fell in and 200 feet of the dam washed out to a depth of fifty feet.”*

If this account is from the August 10, 1900 Johnstown Tribune, which Shappee cites as the source for PRR Watchman Joseph Leckey’s account, then it is difficult to believe since surely a 200 foot wash out and 45 foot of water behind the dam would have resulted in more than just raising the level of the Conemaugh only 3 feet as detailed in the Johnstown Tribune’s second article! There wouldn’t have been a “wall of water” on the scale of what occurred in 1889, but there would have been more force and more substance to the waters escape from the dam.

**Would the phrasing “contained 45 foot of water” be more acceptable for footnote 48?**

28.) p. 224-“One of Carnegie’s sleazy acquaintances, Benjamin Ruff, was the developer and

 president of the club.”

-The statement is true about Benjamin Ruff being the president of the Club.

-Other than just assumption that Ruff and Carnegie were acquaintances because Ruff was a railroad contractor and Carnegie worked for the Pennsylvania Railroad, where is the author’s proof that Carnegie and Ruff were acquainted?

There’s no proof either way. The Author’s theory is that Ruff would have at some point made Carnegie’s acquaintance as a tunnel contractor for one of the railroads with which Carnegie was associated.

-This analyst takes issue with the word “sleazy.” If Benjamin Ruff was in fact a “sleazy” person, then let the facts play out to prove that point. *The Bosses Club*, time and time again, paints the picture that anybody associated with the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club was inherently “bad,” without much in the way of fact to prove why.

I’ll remove the word “sleazy” and only show his picture in the next edition of *The Bosses Club.*
With regard to the Analyst’s assertion that “time and time again, [the Author] paints the picture that anybody associated with the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club was inherently “bad”, without much in the way of fact to prove why”, the Author has to ask: isn’t 2,209 deaths bad enough? Earlier in his analysis the Analyst had suggested that the Author “let the facts play out to prove that point”, yet he ignores the club’s culpability in the 1889 Johnstown Flood and assumes their innocence? Are you kidding me!

29.) p. 224-“A small wooden bridge had to be built across *the spillway* to gain access from the

 South Fork side, and a narrow road ran across the top of the dam.”

-This is a minor, but important point that goes to prove this analysts conclusions in point 4, above, that the South Fork Dam only had one spillway. On p. 12 of *The Bosses Club*, the author claims that the dam had two spillways. However, here on p. 224, he refers to “the spillway;” the author is telling on himself; that even he can’t find viable references for a secondary spillway. This page also discusses some of the changes made to the dam after it was purchased by the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club. Part of the discussion is the changes made to *the* spillway by the Club. If there was a second spillway, then why aren’t there references or any mention of changes made to a second spillway?

This editing oversight will be corrected in the next edition *of* *The Bosses Club.* The Author will meticulously review *The Bosses Club* to ensure that it does not inadvertently refer singularly to “spillway” when it should more precisely refer to “the primary spillway”. This is a petty and picayune point that is not worthy of the Analyst even mentioning it!

The section from page 224, above quoted, will be edited to read: “A small wooden bridge had to be built across the primary spillway to gain access from the South Fork side, and a narrow road ran across the lowered top of the dam.” [underlined sections identify changes]

I completely stand by my assertion and the earlier provided substantial documentation that the dam was originally well designed and originally well built with two spillways.

30.) p. 226-“The other restriction was a reminder that The Club House would be off limits and

 for members only.”

You are citing and apparently objecting to a fictional exchange between Benjamin Ruff and Henry Viering after Ruff observed Viering sailing on Lake Conemaugh and subsequently asked him to become a Sailing Instructor at the Club. Viering had asked if he could bring his family to Lake Conemaugh when he was instructing. From *The Bosses Club,* I’ve below quoted Ruff’s and Viering’s fictional exchange, including Ruff’s fictional overtures for Viering to become the Club’s Sailing Instructor:

*“After unfolding his arms, the dark-bearded man approached and demanded to know, “What the hell are you doing here?” And without waiting for an answer continued, “where the hell did you learn to sail like that?” Henry replied by rotating his hand in a small circle above his shoulder, “Right here.”*

*“I mean who taught you to sail?” There was certain truculence in the stranger’s manner.*

*“No one, I taught myself.”*

*The bearded man then said in a very authoritative voice, “You know this is a private lake and you’re trespassing on it.”*

*“I’ve been coming up here most of my life,” Henry replied. “It’s hard for me to think that I’ve done something wrong.”*

*“Do you live around here?”*

*“I live in Johnstown,” Henry said. “And I was hoping I could leave my boat here so I could come up Sunday afternoons, after church of course, and when the wind is good. You see, I run my own furniture business and can’t make it up here during the weekdays. But it’s just fifteen minutes on the railroad.”*

*The harsh-looking man interrupted Henry and continued to probe with questions of an almost personal nature. After finding out that Henry was actually a businessman who was only interested in the lake for sailing—and not just local riff-raff sneaking in to fish—he pursued an idea.*

*Adopting a much lighter tone, the stranger asked, “have either of you ever considered teaching anyone else to sail?”*

*Eliza, wanting to be any place but there, quickly said, “I don’t like sailing, I’m just here to help my brother.”*

*Henry, interested in the opportunity said, “if anyone is truly interested, I would be most happy to show them exactly how it’s done. Why, are you interested in learning?”*

*That’s when the gentleman introduced himself as Benjamin Ruff of the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club. “No, I’m not interested for myself, but I am responsible for the development of the lake for the club members. Just on the other side of the lake, we’re building summer cottages and a very handsome clubhouse. Watching how you and your sister handled that sailboat gave me the idea that we should offer sailing lessons for members who want to learn to sail.”*

*Henry, his face lighting up as he realized what a great opportunity this could be, exclaimed, “That’s a great idea.”*

*Ruff asked, “when could you be available?”*

*“I’d love to do it on the weekends,” Henry replied, “if my wife and children are also welcome.”*

*Being as anxious to get Henry committed to being his instructor as Henry was in doing it, the gentleman reached out his hand and said, “It’s done then, you’re our club sailing expert and instructor. By the way, how many children do you have?”*

*“Three. Lizzie almost 10, my boy Henry now 3, and our brand new baby boy, George, born last year,” Henry said with obvious pride.*

*Benjamin Ruff took one of Henry’s business cards and promised he would be back in touch with him with approval about which days and times Henry would be permitted to come to the lake to give lessons. The other restriction was a reminder that The Club House would be off limits, and for members only. Henry agreed and was glad that he continued to have a place for his sailboat.”*

 I honestly don’t understand what you’re objecting too. Are you suggesting that the Club House was open to the public or that the Club didn’t zealously protect and hide itself from local discovery and disclosure?

From Shappee’s own 1940 Ph.D. dissertation “A History of Johnstown and the Great Flood of 1889: A study of Disaster and Rehabilitation” he writes on Pages 221 and 222 :

 *“The 70 acres of land and 500 acres of water were strictly private: numerous trespass signs warned off even the neighbors. Trouble developed between the club and residents living near the property in 1884. The Club erected screens at the mouths of the streams that drained into Lake Conemaugh – Rorabaugh’s Creek, Muddy Run, South Fork Creek and Topper’s Run. Natives who covertly fished at the mouths of the creeks tore the obstructions out. The Club authorities threatened to shoot trespassers who invaded their property after dark. In 1885, Joseph Leahey, who owned a farm bordering the lake, claimed that water flooded eight acres of his land. Being unable to secure satisfaction at the Clubhouse, Leahey, for a fee, rented fishing space on his submerged acres where fishermen might catch the Club member’s [stocked] Lake Erie Bass. When the Club members* *threatened court action, Leahey, with fifty year’s residence at the reservoir site, was still undaunted. The Club then tried to buy the farm but Leahey refused to sell. Finally, Colonel Unger, through an intermediary, bought the farm for $4,000; then withheld it from the Club until he secured his price.”*

Earlier in his dissertation, Shappee wrote beginning on Pages 213:

 *“Organizing a non-profit corporation under the regulations of the “Act for the Incorporation and Regulation of Certain Corporations” of April 29, 1874, the [South Fork Fishing and Hunting] Club sought a charter in November 1879. Judge Edwin H. Stone of the Allegheny Court of Common Pleas signed the charter on November 17. The articles of incorporation were eight in number; the second of which declared the object of the Club to be the “protection and propagation of game and game fish, and the enforcement of all the laws of this State against the unlawful killing and wounding of the same.” The place of business was declared to be Pittsburgh. Capital was set at $10,000 in $100 shares. Sixteen subscribers were listed for an initial forty-two shares. B. F. Ruff was named for eight shares; Henry Clay Frick for six; the other subscribers for two apiece. Ruff was the first President; E. A. Meyers, Secretary; W. L. McClintock, Treasurer.”*

 *“The incorporators and Judge Stone ignored that provision of the act of April 29, 1874 which provided that the application for a charter had to be recorded in the “office for recording in and for the county where the chief operations were to be carried on.” As a result, examination of the Club and their plans were [sic] removed from the residents of Cambria County. The charter was secured without the knowledge of the authorities of Cambria County. A close examination of the Johnstown Tribune [newspaper] shows that [its publisher] Swank and the residents of Johnstown had no accurate information of the projected Club and its plans for the old reservoir. The Tribune on October 14, 1879 related the “rumors” of plans for a summer resort to be built at South Fork by the “Western Game and Fish Association of Pittsburgh”. On the following day the Tribune carried an advertisement for fifty men to work at the reservoir but no name of the organization was given. Another article in the same issue reported that the reservoir had been purchased by the Western Game and Fish Association. When a rain on Christmas Day, 1879 carried away the repairs to the wall, the Tribune even though the charter had been granted before this date, still used the incorrect name.”*

And so on. There are numerous examples of over four years of misdirection and redirection by Club members in order to hide their existence and their plans from locals.

Finally, Shappee writes on Page 214:

 *“The Pittsburgh men remained secretive about their project in Cambria County. The Club members and their agents, even after the correct title had been granted by a charter, continued to give false names to their organization to the curious who went up to the dam to watch the repairs. Recalling the fact that the charter was secured in the wrong county, the South Fork Club men, by using the wrong name, prevented an examination of their plans; and concealed the irregularity of their charter. It was not until the Tribune copied articles from the Pittsburgh Commercial Gazzette of July 3-4, 1883 that the correct name of the organization was secured in Johnstown.”*

This reveals two things:

 1) That Unger surreptitiously bought Leahey’s farm from him under false pretenses by misrepresenting himself. This raises the following question from the Author: while published accounts, including Shappee’s, assert that Ruff acquired eight shares in the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club for $800 – an enormous amount of money for that era - and since it wasn’t uncommon for transactions to hide the actual principles, is it at all plausible that Ruff’s shares could have been acquired in his name on behalf of (as a proxy for) someone else?
 For instance, farms like Leahy’s and company’s like the Piper and Shiffler Bridge Company, were often bought and began, respectively, under false pretenses on behalf of someone else.

 I recognize that there’s no proof for this theory and there’s documentation that Ruff acquired these eight shares, but, as we’ve learned: as more has been discovered sometimes as we learn about what really happened, the actual history confounds even the most gifted historian’s accounts (cf. Carnegie’s documented membership in the SFF&HC, previously denied by the NPS). In the Leahy farm case, Unger acquired the Leahy farm through his proxies without Leahy’s knowledge that the proxies were acting on Unger’s behalf; in the case of the Piper and Shiffler Bridge Company, Carnegie, J. Edgar Thompson (whose interest was surreptitiously held in his wife’s name) and others interests were acquired through their proxies since they were still employed by the PRR while beginning their bridge company – a clear conflict of interest.

 2) That the Club’s members actively provided misinformation and misrepresented their intentions to locals in an effort to deter locals from being able to find out for themselves details about the Club’s plans, activities and membership, as detailed in the Shappee account above.

 Again, I don’t know exactly what you’re objecting to since the Club’s efforts to maintain their privacy are well documented, as are the Club’s threats to locals if they dared to trespass. I submit that it wouldn’t have at all been out of character for Ruff to have told Viering that the Club House was “off limits” and “for members only”.

-According to the “South Fork F. & H. Club Rules and Regulations for Members and Visitors at Club House, 1885,” rule #10 stated: “Servants will not be permitted to occupy rooms in the new part of the Club House.” [The new part is the portion that stands today]. While we don’t know for sure, the language of this ruling suggests and in the first section, completed in 1881, some sort of arrangement was made whereby staff could have a room. It’s the assertion of the Johnstown Flood National Memorial that this would have been the case during the offseason or in periods where member attendance was low, but we have no evidence to prove that.

If the NPS has no evidence to prove or disprove their speculation regarding lodging arrangements for servants, then aren’t you guilty of also doing what the Author has done by “filling in the gaps” of documented history with your own plausible theory? The Author has no issue with the NPS doing this but is astounded that you would then object when the Author does the same in his clearly fictional account. Certainly your criticisms of the Author for sometimes failing to clearly identify when he is providing a plausible theory are justified and will be addressed, as much as is humanly possible, in the next edition of *The Bosses Club.* But the Analyst’s language throughout his Analysis and his criticism of the Author for having a plausible theory to “fill in the gaps” of documented history, has sounded rather unnecessarily harsh and often petty; and it is troubling that you use that to justify blackballing *The Bosses Club*.

31.) p. 227-Text on The Stone Bridge.

I think you mean p. 224 - in chapter XIX: Diversification 1877 - 1880

-This is another prime example of something being placed in the wrong timeframe. This section is for the years 1877-1880, but The Stone Bridge construction did not begin until 1887 and it was not ready for use until October 1888. Again, having historical facts put in the wrong timeframe is very troubling.

This is an inadvertent mistake. Thank you for pointing it out.

Would you accept the following revision: “The Stone Bridge construction did not begin until 1887 and it was not ready for use until October 1888, less than a year before the flood”. If this language is acceptable to the NPS, I’ll incorporate it into the next edition of *The Bosses Club* and move this to the appropriate Chapter XXII – The Years 1885-1888*.* **Please advise.**

32.) p. 240-Reference made to second spillway.

-Again, see point 4.

Again, please see the prior answers I’ve provided on this subject extensively documenting that there was originally a second spillway.

33.) p. 240-“With historic weather patterns in this area that seasonally sent local streams over

 their banks, it was inevitable that one day the dam would be destroyed and all hell

 would be visited upon the Conemaugh Valley. All members were setting themselves

 up for a colossal lawsuit if this dam ever failed. At the very least, they would be

 found guilty of negligence.”

-At best, this is grossly misworded. While many sources explain that the Conemaugh Valley flooded often and, in the 1880s, with increasing intensity each year, it was not a foregone conclusion that the dam would break and “unleash all hell.” Fears were entertained that the dam would break but it never did. Flood survivor and author Rev. Dr. David J. Beale explains the prevailing thought in Johnstown about what would happen if the dam failed, “When one of our leading citizens was asked at this time [About 2:00 pm, Friday, May 31, 1889] how much higher he thought the flood would reach if the Conemaugh Lake or reservoir would give way, his reply was, ‘About two feet.’” (Beale, David J. Through the Johnstown Flood: By a Survivor. Edgewood Publishing, 1890, pp. 24-25).

So, based on Beale’s anonymous account of “one of” Johnstown’s “leading citizens”, with no suggestion as to who that “leading citizen” was or what that “leading citizen’s” credentials were, you are criticizing the Author’s plausible theory that “all hell would be visited upon the Conemaugh Valley” if the dam broke? The Author finds that criticism to be completely incredulous, especially since that’s exactly what happened!

However, the Author does agree with the Analyst that the passage referenced from p. 240 could be reworded as follows in a subsequent edition of *The Bosses Club*:

“Historic area weather patterns seasonally sent local streams over their banks. So, it was likely that one day the dam’s integrity would be tested, and all hell would be visited upon the Conemaugh Valley if the dam catastrophically failed. All SFF&HC members were setting themselves up for a colossal lawsuit if this dam ever failed. At the very least, they would be found guilty of negligence for poorly rebuilding the dam and not rebuilding it to its original design.”

-The people of Johnstown themselves never pressed the issue, at least not according to flood survivor Dr. Victor G. Heiser, 16-years old at the time of the flood and orphaned by the disaster: “The townspeople, like those who lived in the shadow of Vesuvius grew calloused to the possibility of danger, ‘Someday, they said, that dam will give way, but it won’t ever happen to us.’” (Heiser, Victor. An American Doctor’s Odyssey: Adventures in Forty-Five Countries. New York: W.W. Norton, 1936, p.3)

So, you are representing that a then 16-years old’s viewpoint represented that of ALL Johnstowners at that time?

You forget that I too have eye witnesses that contradict the above, but unfortunately these other eye witness accounts were never made part of the so-called “historical record”. Those eye witnesses are from the following families (parents and children): George A. Gregory, Pattern Maker Cambria Iron Company; Stephen B. Gregory, Chief of Cambria Iron Company Police; Henry Viering (business person whose family suffered great losses in the flood) and Patrick Graham, Captain Co. E Pennsylvania 54th Volunteers and Justice of the Peace.

-To say that the Club members were “…setting themselves up…” is tantamount to saying they knowingly invested in a faulty dam. At the time of the dam’s failure the Club had 61 members, its charter includes 16, meaning that through the years other members joined. If the dam was known to be faulty, why would 45 additional members sign their names to the clubs roll?

This is flawed logic. Just because you can flim-flam good people into investing in the SFF&HC is not proof that a scheme is sound. Surely, you’re not suggesting that the club’s deviations from the dam’s original design when they poorly rebuilt and poorly repaired it did not directly cause its failure? There were few members who knew how the dam had originally been built and that its flood control pipes (sluice pipes) had been removed and the dam’s breast had been lowered so that the emergency, secondary spillway wasn’t then visible – but a few did: Andrew Carnegie and Pitcairn for sure!

34.) p. 242-Morrell’s suspicions that the Club was up to no good.

-Page 242 of *The Bosses Club* is full of myth and conjecture and badly flies in the face of accurate history based on the facts. No credible source indicates that Morrell’s offer to join the Club was at first rebuffed simply because he was from Johnstown.

There’s no myth in *The Bosses Club.* The Author feels his so-called “conjecture” about this, while neither proven or disproven by the facts, is certainly plausible based on human nature: Morrell was snubbed by the club’s members when they rejected his offer to loan Cambria Iron Works engineers to the club, whose members were poorly repairing and poorly rebuilding the dam – per his engineers prior inspection – and, in addition, incredulously the SFF&HC members rejected Morrell’s generous offer to pay for half of the repairs while providing his company’s engineers to advise which repairs were necessary to ensure that the dam was sound.

Yet, the club’s members rejected his generous offer – no one really knows why, but I suspect it was because they thought that by virtue of their being captains of industry they knew more about dams than his Cambria Iron Works engineers. So, it is absolutely true that the Author feels that the SFF&HC rejected Morrell’s membership application in part because he was from Johnstown. Again, the Author’s so-called “conjecture” is not proven or disproven by the facts, but it is certainly plausible. If the NPS wants to dispute the Author’s theory, please provide another reason?

-No credible source states that Morrell thought the Club had ulterior motives, but rather that he thought the people playing with the dam were naïve at the job and wanted to make sure every effort was made to secure the dam.

Okay. Morrell’s only “ulterior motive” was to ensure that the dam was sound, giving rise to Morrell’s suspicions about the motives of those SFF&HC actions contrary to those which would have ensured that the dam was sound.

-No credible sources states that Morrell suspected Ruff was just a puppet of the Pittsburgh wealth machine.

-Research shows that while Carnegie had many connections to the men who became members of the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club, the man who served as Club spokesman and promoter in Pittsburgh was Frick, not Carnegie. On p. 243 of *The Bosses Club*, when the author tries to prove how Carnegie influenced people to join the Club, he only succeeds in showing how Frick was connected to these members, not Carnegie.

Okay, so Frick was the culprit. He is also blamed for the Homestead strike. After all Carnegie was then in Scotland. Maybe that’s why Frick is famously quoted as saying “I will meet you in hell” to Andrew Carnegie.

35.) p. 243-“Colonel Elias J. Unger never served in the military nor earned the title of “Colonel,”

 but used it willingly and continued to do what he was told and kept his mouth shut.”

-Unger kept his mouth shut about what?

I think Unger got the job as the club’s manager because he ran a Pittsburgh Hotel owned by the PRR, and Carnegie could have certainly known of him through that. Unger’s reputation to Carnegie was then likely that Unger did a good job and did as he was told.

-History actually provides a great example of how Colonel Unger wasn’t just a “willing patsy,” as *The Bosses Club* seems to declare. On pages 82-84 of the Harlan Unrau, *Historic Resource Study: The South Fork Dam*, it tells the story of how Colonel Unger was taken to court by the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club. Colonel Unger was told by the Club to buy what ultimately became the “Unger House,” and then hand it over to the Club. Colonel Unger did indeed buy the property, but kept it for himself, rather than handing it over to the club. This is a clear piece of evidence that Colonel Unger didn’t just always “do as he was told” by the Club, as *The Bosses Club* would have readers believe. Unrau’s source for this story is: *Johnstown Daily Tribune*, December 23, 1855.

You’re right, he didn’t *always* do as he was told, just most of the time. Have you or anyone else at the NPS followed the money to ascertain how an Inn keeper was in a position to buy those additional acres?

36.) p. 244-“Whoever was in charge, Carnegie would not allow the Club to be influenced by

 Morrell’s money or advice.” This is referring to the engineering reports that were

 conducted in 1880 by representatives of the Cambria Iron Company to determine if

 the dam was safe or not. The author is inferring that Andrew Carnegie did not want

 any of the repairs made to the dam.

There’s nothing to either prove or disprove this. I don’t know who it was (does it really even matter who it was?) but it doesn’t make any sense that the club rejected Cambria Iron’s offer to pay half the cost for the repairs and rebuilding which Cambria Iron’s loaned engineers found necessary.

Again, why does the NPS seem to take issue with the Author’s plausible theory that SFF&HC member Carnegie didn’t want appropriate repairs made to the dam? There’s no proof either way and the Author’s speculation is a key element to his fictional story. The NPS doesn’t take issue with inaccuracies and salacious and insulting statements made in other accounts they sell in their stores, so why take issue with the Author’s plausible theory, especially because there’s no proof either way?

-Please refer to point 26; simply put any decision about the care of the dam, according to historic documentation, wouldn’t even have been up to Carnegie.

If you’re buying what accepted history is selling – I think the people should have the choice to read other views and make up their own mind.

37.) p. 251-“Author’s Note: Since current history almost exclusively credits Henry Clay Frick

 for developing the coke industry in Fayette County, I doubt that many people know

 why the most heavily travelled highway in Fayette County, Route 119, is named

 Morrell Avenue where it passes through Connellsville, nor why there is a street in

 South Connellsville named Cambria Avenue or a town called Morrell or how the

 Morrell Mine and Coke Works got their names.
 They were all named for Cambria Iron Companies General Manager Daniel

 Morrell. Besides the mine and coke works mentioned above, others owned by

 Cambria Iron company [sic] in Fayette County were Atlas Mine & Coke Works and

 Mahoning Mine & Coke Works, both in Dunbar Twp.”

-The analyst finds no fault with the facts contained in this Author’s Note, however the author may want to change the approach. Using a phrase like, “I doubt that many people know…” is argumentative and should be strayed away from; in fact, the author risks alienating his audience with the use of such a phrase. A better approach might be something along the lines of: “Since current history almost exclusively credits Henry Clay Frick for developing the coke industry in Fayette County, *it is interesting to note that* the most heavily travelled…”

I appreciate your sincere input to make my book better. I only wish I had better writing skills. My sole interest is to get to the truth wherever it leads. Your suggestions will be incorporated into the next revision of *The Bosses Club.*

38.) p. 252-Andrew Carnegie is at the Club for sailing lessons.

-This analyst will let this go as it is in the *Disclaimer* that there is no proof that Andrew Carnegie ever set foot on club grounds. This part is clearly a part of the fictional story and there is plenty in place to let readers know that.

Good, thank you

39.) p. 252-253-Carnegie inspects “yon spillway,” and states that he needs to see to it that

 fishing screens are needed since the fish are escaping out of the spillway.

-On p. 12, of *The Bosses Club*, the author declares that the South Fork Dam had two spillways. This is refuted in point 4. However, if the dam had two spillways as the author suggests and this is his story, then why does a main character in the story refer to the dam as only having one spillway? For instance, the Carnegie character in *The Bosses Club* states, “…the lake is losing fish over *the* [emphasis added] spillway.” (*The Bosses Club*, p. 253)

-This might be a part of the fictional story, but it would not have been up to Carnegie to install the fish screens since he had no real leadership role at the club, again, see point 26.

It’s a fact that someone ordered or prompted the ordering of the fish screens. Why couldn’t it have been member Carnegie? Carnegie was in the bridge building business and was familiar with the fabrication of many parts. These fish screens were not something that could be ordered from a hardware store, but rather these fish screens were custom fabricated from rods placed closely together (either by welding or bolting). The other members not associated with Carnegie are all mostly business people – who among them had the knowledge of what skilled craftsmen could do with iron? It seems perfectly logically that someone in the steel industry that was also a member of the club would be consulted or solicited to solve their problem. That very easily could have been Carnegie. Or does the NPS know who ordered the fish screen, from whom and who installed it?

I contend the dam originally had two spillways. By the Author’s use of the singular word *the* [emphasis added] it does not prove the Author’s confusion on this point or prove that the dam originally had only one spillway. One spillway was cut into or out of solid stone and water ran over it in a series of beautiful waterfalls down over the cut stones. The second spillway was a waste weir or emergency spillway. It wasn’t cut into the rock like the first spillway. It was smooth and broad like the secondary waste weir at the Eastern Reservoir – thereby avoiding or minimizing erosion. You can still observe this at the Eastern Reservoir. Water never rose high enough for it to run over the second, emergency spillway. By lowering the breast down to the same level as the second, emergency spillway, the second, emergency spillway became virtually useless and blended into the dam’s breast, appearing to be simply a widening of the breast. When the lake was refilled the Club had essentially eliminated the second, emergency spillway by lowering the breast. The fictional dialogue where Carnegie says “… the lake is losing fish over the spillway” is contextual since Carnegie’s frame of reference at that point is the dam as it had been poorly rebuilt, not as it had been originally built. As for Carnegie’s role in the fish screens, it is true that someone ordered them – and that someone was likely a member. Carnegie was a member. So, the Author’s theory that Carnegie ordered or prompted the ordering of the fish screens is certainly plausible.

40.) p. 256-The burial of Daniel J. Morrell

-*The Bosses Club* states that upon his death, Daniel J. Morrell was buried at Grandview Cemetery. Various sources, however, confirm that Morrell was first buried at Sandy Vale Cemetery, then eventually his remains were removed to Grandview Cemetery.

The Author will include a Footnote explaining this in the next edition of *The Bosses Club*. Grandview was created in1885 the first intermit was Lucretia Hammond on April 30, 1887. Morrell died Aug 20, 1885. Thank you for pointing this out.

41.) pp. 283-294-This is where the conspiracy theory language really plays out. Essentially, the

 South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club, at the command of Andrew Carnegie

 simply refused to make any repairs to the South Fork Dam so that, one day, the

 dam would fail, destroy the Cambria Iron Company, and completely eliminate

 it as a competitor to Carnegie’s steel interests in Pittsburgh. This all plays out

 in a discussion between one of the engineers who inspected the dam in 1880 \ sic.

 for the Cambria Iron Company and the author’s great grandfather.

-This analyst’s first question is, did this discussion really take place? If so, then this should be included in an “Author’s Note.” This would be worth mentioning.

Perhaps the Analyst missed it but below the entire Author’s DISCLAIMER from page xii of the second edition of *The Bosses Club* is reproduced*.* So, in fact, contrary to the Analyst’s criticism, the Author has specifically and prominently declared that “*All the dialogue, letters, maps and some of the historical figures’ actions mentioned in this work are conjecture as to what might have taken place and were literary liberties taken by me.*” I don’t know how the Author can more prominently convey to the reader that the dialogue is conjecture by the Author.

-In a suspicious culture such as ours, this makes great drama but unfortunately, flies in the face of what really happened.

The Analyst has interestingly criticized the Author’s fictional conjectured dialogue as flying “in the face of what really happened”. Yet, the last time the Author had checked there was much that was still unknown. If the NPS has proof of “what really happened” during the various intervening periods of time during which the official position seems to be that much is unknown, such as the period from 1862 to 1875, then please share it.

The author met with this analyst and Chief of Interpretation Megan O’Malley on Thursday, March 26 [2015]. During that discussion, the author stated his displeasure with the book *Waterproof*, a novel based on the Johnstown Flood. The author took specific issue with the portions of *Waterproof* that state that angry citizens of Johnstown committed acts of arson and vandalism against the former members of the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club. Since those things didn’t happen in reality, and the parks sell *Waterproof* why won’t the parks sell *The Bosses Club*, since the author claims the work is fiction?

It is this analyst’s opinion that the story contained in *Waterproof* is completely fiction. In fact, Barbara Redline Coopey, author of *Waterproof* includes this statement right before the main text starts, “This is a work of fiction. Any resemblance to persons, living or dead, is purely coincidental.”

Please understand that the Author is NOT displeased with the book *Waterproof* nor is he seeking its removal from the NPS stores. However, the Author feels that the NPS and the Analyst have treated *The Bosses Club* unequally relative to their treatment of the book *Waterproof* and the McCullough book *The Johnstown Flood.*

Would the Analyst and the NPS prefer that the Author’s DISCLAIMER, reproduced below, start with the exact same wording as the disclaimer contained in *Waterproof,* in addition to the extant wording, or that the Author’s DISCLAMER ONLY contain the exact same language as that disclaimer contained in *Waterproof?* If so, then the Author can certainly do either if that would allow the NPS to sell *The Bosses Club* in their stores. However, the Author feels that his current DISCLAIMER is actually far more extensive and far more precise and exacting than that contained in *Waterproof.* **Please advise.**

***Disclaimer:***

*This is a work of fiction based on facts, undisputed history and undisputed historical actions by historical figures. This fictional work challenges settled history, but it’s a history that to this day has many unanswered questions regarding the Johnstown Flood of 1889.*

*All the dialogue, letters, maps and some of the historical figures’ actions mentioned in this work are conjecture as to what might have taken place and were literary liberties taken by me. Where possible, I have footnoted where I’ve done this and provided the factual basis supporting my decision to fictionalize some of the actions of some historical figures. For instance there is no proof that Andrew Carnegie ever set foot on the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club property.*

*There are no “smoking gun” facts that conclusively demonstrate that the historical figures written about herein intentionally caused the South Fork Dam’s failure.*

*The reader should not rely on this work to form any conclusions about the historical figures and events mentioned in this fictional work.*

*Rather, I hope this work stimulates the reader to do their own research and draw their own conclusions. My ancestors lived these events and have passed down many family stories that formed the basis for my suspicions.*

 *Richard A. Gregory*

The author of that work makes it perfectly clear that other than the flood happening and references to the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club, the whole story is based on fiction.

Are you implying that the Author’s DISCLAIMER, reproduced above from page xii in the second edition of *The Bosses Club*, doesn’t make “it perfectly clear that other than the flood happening and references to the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club, the whole story is based on fiction.”? The preceding Author’s DISCLAIMER absolutely conveys the same thing!

This analyst has read *Waterproof* and finds no fault with that work; it is obviously fiction. *The Bosses Club*, on the other hand, as stated at various places above, takes readers on a roller coaster ride through fiction and nonfiction elements. Whether meant to be fiction or not, the major claim in the book is that the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club and, especially, its member Andrew Carnegie intentionally sabotaged the dam in some way to fail and cause damage to the Cambria Iron Company. Or, to put it another way, the major claim, fiction or not, is that the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club and, especially, its member Andrew Carnegie were mass murderers.

There is absolutely NO MERIT to the Analyst’s criticism that *The Bosses Club’s* “major claim” is that Andrew Carnegie or the SFF&HC members “intentionally sabotaged” the dam! The Author takes great issue with this accusation by the Analyst and NPS and wants the Analyst and NPS to cite exactly where *The Bosses Club* has made such a specific “major claim”? Contrary to taking the reader on a wild ride of highs and lows The Author knows there are none because the Author has carefully crafted his story around what’s known while providing the Author’s own very plausible theories where evidence was not available and the truth is blank The well documented evidence of Carnegie’s money lust and pattern of manipulating others while acting as an “invisible hand” in various enterprises provides additional circumstantial evidence that weaves together what’s known with the Author’s plausible theories where evidence was not available.

Since *The Bosses Club* states fact and fiction side by side, that makes it hard for a reader to determine whether the conspiracy theory is stated as fact or fiction. If either Allegheny Portage Railroad National Historic Site or Johnstown Flood National Memorial sold *The Bosses Club*, These National parks, units of the National Park Service, a department of the United States Federal Government, would essentially be stating that they stand behind the claim-whether meant to be fiction or not-that Club members were involved in some great act of mass murder and that is not something the parks should be involved in.

So, the Analyst, on behalf of the NPS, a department of the US Federal Government, is essentially saying that because the NPS sells the sensationalized fictional book *Waterproof* in their stores in addition to the often inaccurate McCullough book, *The Johnstown Flood*, that the NPS then “stands behind” those author’s works? In the case of *Waterproof,* the NPS is essentially saying that they “stand behind” that Author’s sensational claim that “angry citizens of Johnstown committed acts of arson and vandalism against the former members of the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club”, even though there’s no evidence that that had ever happened. In the case of McCullough’s *The Johnstown Flood,* the NPS is essentially saying that they “stand behind” McCullough’s work, even though it is, in some cases, egregiously inaccurate or makes sloppy, inaccurate and unsupported assertions (see below)?

For instance, on page 63 of McCullough’s book he inaccurately and misleadingly writes:

 *“… the Cambria Iron Company sent two of its men to the lake with instructions to make a critical examination. The dam looked perfectly solid to the Johnstown men, and they returned home with their report in time to make the evening edition of the paper”*

Contrast McCullough’s preceding account with that of Shappee, who wrote about this on pages 217 and 218 of his 1940 dissertation:

 *“After describing the dam and making a sketch of the embankment, Fulton gave his estimate of the wall and its repairs: It is evident, therefore, that the water cannot overturn, or slide, the dam out, en masse – There appears to me two serious elements of danger in the dam: 1st. The want of a discharge pipe to reduce or take the water out of the dam for needed repairs [the sluice pipes]. 2nd. The unsubstantial method of repair [sic], leaving a large leak, which appears to be cutting the new embankment. As the water level cannot be lowered, the difficulty arises of reaching the source of the present destructive leaks. At present there is 40 feet of water in the dam, when the full head of 60 feet is reached, it appears to me to be only a question of time until the former cutting is repeated. Should this break be made during a season of flood, it is evident that considerable damage would ensure along the line of the Conemaugh. It is impossible to estimate how disastrous this flood would be, as its force would depend on the size of the breach in the dam with proportional rapidity of discharge. The stability of the dam can only be assured by a thorough overhauling of the present lining on the upper slope, and the construction of an ample discharge pipe to reduce or remove the water to make necessary repairs.”*

Shappee goes on to write “The assistant engineer, W. A. Fellows, also condemned the repairs to the dam.”

**That sure as heck doesn’t sound like the rebuilt dam “looked perfectly solid to the Johnstown men”!**

Further, on page 65 of McCullough’s book he confuses the Stonycreek and Conemaugh rivers and Somerset and Cambria counties (the Stonycreek is in Somerset County while the Conemaugh River flows from Cambria County into Westmoreland County and points beyond, eventually dumping into the Allegheny River north of Pittsburgh). In addition, McCullough writes that “In 1880 again another dam broke; it had been built by Cambria Iron, but without saying where it was or putting in a footnote as to where it was supposed to be.
**In order to reduce the volume of pages answering the analyst, I’ve placed my criticism of David McCullough’s *The Johnstown Flood* at the end of this response on separate sheets. Please see the additional pages.**

Further, the Analyst, on behalf of the NPS, a department of the US Federal Government, is explicitly saying that the tragedy of the 1889 Johnstown Flood, in which 2,209 innocents lost their lives, wasn’t caused by the actions and inactions of the members of the SFF&HC even though this conclusion flies in the face of the conclusions reached by those who performed extensive forensic analysis of the dam’s failure (cf. Katkins and company and Frank)?

The citizens of Johnstown didn’t get their day in court so I am trying to make an argument as an attorney might do in prosecuting a case. I’ve pieced together suppositions and factual evidence as well as circumstantial evidence to try to make sense of this tragedy. The surviving citizens of Johnstown didn’t get a trial nor did they ever get the opportunity to question John Reilly or Colonel Unger, John Parke and members of the SFF&HC to find out how the clubs decisions were made.

42.) p. 293-“Author’s Note:” This note touches on why lawsuits against the South Fork Fishing

 & Hunting Club were unsuccessful.

-This analyst disagrees with the assertions made by the author as to why the lawsuits were unsuccessful and this will be explained in a later point.

See my rebuttal.

43.) p. 296-Figure 18-A photo of a flood in Johnstown, dated 1888.

-Is the author sure of the date of the photo? It is captioned 1888, but this analyst is pretty certain that the photo is actually from Johnstown’s 1887 flood. While there was a flood in 1888, Johnstown’s worst flood prior to 1889 was on June 7, 1887. This fact is published in many sources, but does appear twice in (Beale, David J. Through the Johnstown Flood: By a Survivor. Edgewood Publishing, 1890.) It appears once as a recollection by Beale and once in the statement that W. Horace Rose gave to Beale that was included in the book.

The photo was provided by JAHA and they verbally told me it was taken the year before in 1888 but for the sake of correctness I will, in a subsequent edition of *The Bosses Club,* change it to be non-committal and from a previous flood.

44.) p. 298-“Rescue efforts went on through the night, but anyone caught in the smoldering mass

 of debris by the bridge was almost assured of the hellish death of being burned alive.

 The enormous pile of objects that had been so effortlessly placed at the bridge did

 not yield to the feeble efforts of man.”

-It’s this analyst’s opinion that a numerical analysis is needed here. As written, this may give the appearance that perhaps hundreds of people died at the Stone Bridge. According to Nathan D. Shappee, citing the *Johnstown Weekly Tribune* of June 14, 1889, many of those swept into the mass at the bridge were able, simply, to walk away almost as soon as they stopped at the bridge. Of the hundreds who ended their wild ride at the bridge, only 70 bodies were discovered by June 14. (Shappee, Nathan D. “A History of Johnstown and the Great Flood of 1889: A Study of Disaster and Rehabilitation.” Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1940, pp. 276-278)

 “Only 70 bodies were discovered”!? And you think I overstated it? OK, I’ll mention seventy bodies were found, but in McCullough’s book he writes on page 173; “That there looked to be thousands of them and that they seemed insectlike is understandable enough; but evidence is that, at most, perhaps 500 to 600 people were driven into the burning heap, and though exact figures were never settled on, it is likely that all but about 80 of them managed to escape.”

45.) p. 301-“Author’s Note:” It is mentioned here that it is “new information” that the failure of

 the Conemaugh Viaduct made the flood worse at Johnstown.

-This information has actually been known for quite some time. In fact the Rev. H.L. Chapman (minister of Franklin Street M.E. Church, referenced many times in *The Bosses Club*) mentioned this fact in his book, *Memoirs of an Itinerant*, 1905. Forgive the length, but this analyst thinks it necessary to get the point across that people have known for years that the viaduct was the reason why the flood was so destructive when it reached Johnstown:

 “But while the giving way of the reservoir dam may be considered the chief cause of the awful calamity we are about to describe, it may interest some to know that the magnitude of the awful cataclysm, was greatly increased by an obstacle, which it met in its course down through the mountain gorge. About five miles above the fated town stood a massive work of masonry, spanning the Conemaugh River, called the viaduct [Emphasis Added].This had been built by the state about sixty years before, as part of the Portage Railroad, of which we have already spoken. Here the river makes a great bend, to get around a high ridge of land, popularly called “The Hog Back.” The detour is about a mile in extent, and the river comes back after having made a great loop, within perhaps not more than a hundred yards or its own bank; then descends rapidly on its way westward. Here the old Portage Railroad was carried over the river by means of the aforesaid viaduct, so that it need not follow the river around its long cur[v]e. This stone viaduct was of only one grand arch, about sixty feet wide and seventy feet high. This work was so well done, that after serving for several years, it came into the possession of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and had been used by them more than forty years, during which time millions of tons of freight, and passengers had been carried over it without showing the least diminution of strength.

It’s interesting that they built things like the viaduct and Brooklyn Bridge so well that it seemed they could last forever and yet we are expected to accept the conformist view that the dam was originally poorly constructed! I theorize that Carnegie as a Supervisor of the PRR (which included the lake) exerted influence on the SFF&HC well beyond his position, simply as a club member. The club made a number of bad decisions that led to the dam being rebuilt poorly: Not replacing the sluice pipes; lowering the breast of the dam making the emergency spillway worthless; adding a fish screen and then refusing to take action to remove it; to stem the dam’s rise. Why did they do those things? Do I think they had an ulterior motive, no. But whoever was making those decisions, they were callous and the taking of the sluice pipes set off this chain of events. Was it just recklessness on John Reilly’s part or because Carnegie had an industrial need?

Did all the members of the SFF&HC know how the dam was repaired? When did they become members? Under whose influence were they acting? At a minimum ALL members of the SFF&HC, knowledgeable or not, including Carnegie, are culpable in the 1889 Johnstown Flood.

In the interest of fully cooperating with the NPS and the Analyst, the Author will reword the Author’s Note on p. 299 (actually) as follows in a subsequent edition of *The Bosses Club*:

 “Author’s Note: The Conemaugh Viaduct actually increased the killing …”

The place where this stone bridge was erected was a most romantic spot. One could climb up onto the “Hog Back” near where the railroad passed through, and look down into the deep gorge below where the precipitous rocks and shading trees presented a beautiful and refreshing sight. But while the tall arch had always proved sufficient to allow the water to pass; which the river had ever heretofore brought to it, the flood that was now precipitated upon it, with an almost infinite mass of debris upon its turbulent bosom, soon blocked it up, and made it a dam, against which the waters and wreckage of miles of raging flood piled themselves, until it could stand the pressure no longer. It gave way far more suddenly than the clay dam of the reservoir had done, and precipitated from fifteen to twenty feet of the raging torrent into the gorge below. Here it swept all before it scraping the earth down to the very rocks, and churning the mass of earth and water into a substance almost as thick as mortar, and gathering-such floating material-logs, trees, fences, houses, barns, bridges, as came its way. It was this mass of solid matter which caused locomotives to be carried half a mile or more from their place, and swept away houses, churches, mills, and almost anything which it encountered in its course [Emphasis Added].” (Chapman, pp. 271-274)

Thank you for pointing this out I will include some of this information in the next edition.

46.) p. 303-“Bodies have been discovered in the river as far away as Cincinnati, Ohio.”

-While this is true, the discovery of a body did not occur until 1911, not immediately after the flood as is insinuated here.

I will add the date in a subsequent edition of *The Bosses Club*.

47.) p. 310-That Andrew Carnegie was influenced to donate money to rebuild the library by

 something Capt. Bill Jones said, and that, somehow, the Carnegie Library was a

 “victory flag” over Cambria Iron.

I find it ironic that the thing Carnegie is remembered for is his philanthropic contributions and the thousands of libraries he built. I was astounded to learn that the Cambria Library was one of the first library ever built by a commercial venture. The Cambria Library was built by Cambria Iron Company in 1879 – not by Andrew Carnegie. I was further surprised to learn that Carnegie built his first library in Braddock, PA after employing 200+ workers from Cambria Iron – after Cambria Iron had previously built the Cambria Library. However, I was not surprised to learn that the second library that Carnegie built was in Johnstown, PA in 1891, just after the 1889 Johnstown Flood. He obviously liked the idea of building libraries.

 p. 311-That Captain Bill Jones was set up to be killed by Carnegie for confronting him about

 the flood.

-The following is the history of the Carnegie Library, which is now the Johnstown Flood Museum, provided by the Johnstown Area Heritage Association. The Johnstown Area Heritage Association (JAHA) is not only the owner of this building, but, by the very nature of the organization, has had professional historians and curators on staff that can provide an accurate and true history of the building. The following is from <http://www.jaha.org/FloodMuseum/oklahoma.html>:

-“’If the association will allow me to pay the cost of this restoration, I shall be very grateful to it indeed.’ Andrew Carnegie in a November 28, 1889 [not “…a few days…” after the flood] letter [not visit to Johnstown] to the Cambria Library Association. The Johnstown Flood Museum is located in a building with an important flood connection-it is the former Cambria Library, built after the flood to replace the earlier library pictured at right, using funds donated by steel magnate Andrew Carnegie. Carnegie was a member of the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club, which owned the dam that burst on May 31, 1889, causing the flood. He donated the money to build the library after visiting Johnstown in late 1889 [emphasis added] to survey flood damage but it’s unlikely he felt any personal responsibility for the flood [emphasis added]. Instead, the library became one of the first of more than 2,500 Carnegie libraries in the world today. The rebuilt library…was located on the same site was the old one, at the corner of Washington and Walnut Streets. The Cambria Iron Company donated an adjacent tract of land, where the telegraph office had stood before the flood, to increase the library’s lot [emphasis added].

-That last statement brings up two issues with the claims made in *The Bosses Club*: 1.) If the library was a victory flag over Cambria Iron, then why would Cambria Iron have been so willing to donate land for the library project? 2.) The new library was roughly the same size as the old one, so the claim that the building, which did tower over the Cambria Iron office building, was some sort of symbolism of Carnegie’s victory over Cambria Iron is unfounded.

With regard to 1), the Analyst’s question of “why would Cambria Iron have been so willing to donate land for the library project?”. The fact is that the land for the library project had previously been donated by the Cambria Iron company for the library that they built before the 1889 Johnstown Flood. Carnegie merely rebuilt the library on the same land – previously donated by Cambria Iron – from whence the first library had been washed away by the 1889 Johnstown Flood.

With regard to 2), after the Twin Towers were taken down by Muslim Terrorists via two commercial aircraft on 9-11, the citizens of New York City refused to allow a Muslim Mosque to be built on property near where the Twin Towers had once stood. The symbolism if they had allowed Muslim’s to build a Mosque on property near where the Twin Towers had once stood was not lost on the citizens of New York City. Carnegie could have built his library anywhere – the City of Johnstown was on its tail after the 1889 Johnstown Flood and there were vacant lots everywhere. Or, Carnegie could have just donated money for the City fathers to use in any way they chose. Carnegie did neither. He chose to build the replacement library on the exact same site where it had once stood, directly across the street from – and towering over – the Cambria Iron Company headquarters building. Carnegie had wanted to name the library the “Carnegie Library”, but Johnstown’s citizens wouldn’t have it and insisted it be named the “Johnstown Public Library”. So, rather than erect a modest plaque adjacent to the front doors, Carnegie erected a giant (5 3/4 foot by 8½ foot – approximate) custom made bronze plaque over the door with Carnegie’s name larger than any of the other inscriptions on the plaque – sic – see below:

All dimensions approximate

Width: 8 ½ feet

**J**OHNSTOWN **P**UBLIC **L**IBRARY
ERECTED BY THE CAMBRIA IRON CO 1879
DESTROYED BY THE FLOOD OF MAY 31 1889
REBUILDED ENLARGED & IMPROVED BY
**ANDREW CARNEGIE**
**1891**

He I g h t:

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Maybe this wasn’t a “victory flag” – perhaps that characterization is incorrect – however, it is correct to say that Carnegie erected a very large and ostentatious permanent bronze marker to his largesse.

-Whether fact or fiction, again the author portrays Andrew Carnegie as a murderer because he floats the idea that perhaps Carnegie set up the death of Captain Bill Jones in retaliation for Jones confronting Carnegie about the flood. Carnegie wasn’t even in Pittsburgh at the time, but living in New York. Carnegie wasn’t present in the mill the day that Captain Jones died, so he would have had to set it up with the workers to put this plan in place. Even if there was a plan to off Jones, and the workers in the mill were complicit, it seems unlikely that at some point, somebody wouldn’t have said something.

And put their life at risk if Carnegie did have something to do with it?

The death of Captain William R. Jones is explained here in, “History of Allegheny County; The Romance of Steel; Clipping book 1-Catasauqua Public Library himedo.net/The Hopkins Project/Timeline/GenealogyPortraits/CaptWRJonesBios/WRJones\_DWint.htm:

 “On Thursday evening, September 26, 1889, Captain William R. Jones accompanied Suprintendent James Gayley to Furnace C. which had not been working properly all day [Emphasis Added]. Several of the employees [Emphasis Added] were tapping the cinder. In an instant a section of about a foot in dimension about seven feet above their heads, fell out, and a stream of hot coal and metal poured upon the group. Captain Jones in his endeavor to escape fell, between a stone wall and a cinder car, striking his head on the car. His face and hands were also severely burned. One of the employees at once shut off the blast furnace, [Emphasis Added] and the flame ceased. James Tolan, formally of Catasauqua, was in the machine shop nearby, and when he saw Captain “Bill” Jones lying amongst the cinder, he ran in and carried him out. Captain Jones was carried to the company office where he conversed in a dazed manner, while physicians were dressing his burns. He was then taken to the Homeopathic Hospital in Pittsburgh and upon his reaching the hospital his mind commenced to wander, and he remained in a semiconscious state until he died at 10:30 o’clock Saturday night September 28, 1889.” The article goes on to say that Andrew Carnegie served as a pallbearer at Jones’ funeral. There were a lot of people involved, why wouldn’t somebody have said something, then or later? What about risking the life of Superintendent Gayley? After the accident, why did people rush to turn off the blast furnace?

A bit of hyperbole perhaps but never the less a timely consequence. But explaining to me that Carnegie couldn’t be involved because he was not in Pittsburgh or out of the country is also a stretch. I was injecting into my book a bit of a “murder mystery”. **I’ll take this out because it’s not the main issue.** I just found it interesting on my time line that an outspoken person like Jones, who was so familiar with Cambria Iron Company and being a sports minded competitor. He wanted to beat Cambria Iron fair and square, when he Left that company in order to manage Carnegie Steel, but was killed in a freak industrial accident shortly after seeing all the devastation caused by the flood. A direct result of a dam’s failure, caused by shoddy repairs made by the club’s controlling members. Capt. William Jones was known to be outspoken and if he believed his boss Carnegie was responsible he was the type of guy to say so!

48.) pp. 312-313-Conspiracy of Silence. This attempts to explain why the South Fork Fishing &

 Hunting Club was never made to pay restitution. Also, this attempts to explore

 why none of the cases were tried in Cambria County.

-Certainly, the names, reputations, power, and connections of the members of the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club helped in the lawsuits, however, the club’s legal representations in court was not all illegal or nefarious. For instance, the rulings of *Fletcher v. Rylands*, was not in place in 1889. The long and short of it is, if the law had been in existence in 1889, [which essentially says, if property A causes damage to other property B, then the owner of the property A has to pay restitution] then the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club would have had to pay, no questions asked. Without this law, attorneys had to prove that the Club was negligent in its care of the dam beyond a shadow of a doubt. Since a large part of the dam was no longer there after May 31, 1889, proving that the Club was at fault was next to impossible. In civil litigation, the testimony of expert witnesses [scientists or engineers] is key, and the engineers who studied the dam after the flood did not all come to the same conclusions. Some engineers put the club at fault for the dam being faulty, some said that that dam was well built, but rather that Mother Nature was the sole culprit. Without all the experts agreeing, finding the club at fault was very difficult. For a complete discussion of *Fletcher v. Rylands*, and its applications to Pennsylvania, especially dealing with the 1889 Johnstown Flood, please consult:

Shugarman, Jed Handelsman. “The Floodgates of Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the

 Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age.” *Yale Law Journal* 110, no. 333

 (November 2000): 333-377.

Thank you for the suggestion that I review Shugarman’s work, however when you wrote “proving that the Club was at fault was next to impossible” and “finding the club at fault was very difficult” it reveals a naïve bias: there was never a real trial; there was never a lawsuit; there was never any cross examination or discovery – nothing close to a trial. Unless you’ve also had training as a lawyer, I don’t know how you can make such assertions!

And, in fact, your statement and assertion completely ignore the excellent forensic engineering work by Frank and Katkins and company which both arrive at the same conclusion, best stated by Katkins and company on page 47 of their accepted May 27, 2016 report:

*“… we find that the changes made to the South Fork dam [by the SFF&HC] were indeed responsible for the disaster…”*

-The Club members were advised not to say anything, but there is a legitimate reason for the attorneys to advise this. Fifty-five to fifty-six of the sixty-one families were not present at the dam when it failed on Friday, May 31, 1889. If the families spoke out to the press, without seeing what happened first hand, they might run the risk of incriminating themselves without even having all of the facts. Potentially, opposing attorneys could have a field day with these statements. Many of the families would have no idea what to comment on, without having been at the sight. For an attorney to advise their client to take this action, is perfectly legal. Even so, some members did make comments to the newspaper, so there was not complete silence on the matter.

I’m not as confident as you that it would be next to impossible to find the club legally at fault. Perhaps it would have been very difficult to do so in Allegheny County, but it would not have been difficult to have done so anywhere else.

While it may be good legal advice to tell your client to remain silent and not provide to anyone but their attorney’s material directly pertaining to the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club or the dam, I believe that after the flood Johnstown was so devastated and without leadership and so distracted by the recovery effort that they didn’t effect a unified legal front against the overwhelming and unified opposition they faced from the barons of industry.

Just think what may have been learned had all of the following been put on the witness stand under oath:

Colonel Elias Unger John Reilly Henry Clay Frick Louis Semple Clarke
Andrew Mellon Henry Phipps Jr. Robert Pitcairn John Parke

Edgar Thomson & wife Attorney Pershing Andrew Carnegie Attorney James Reed
Attorney Philander Knox W. I. Stineman E. B. Alsop John W. Kephart

Just image if the club’s members were compelled via legal discovery to provide all correspondence and details of:

+ Who ordered the fish screens and their installation? Who fabricated them?

+ Who instructed that the breast be lowered?
+ What were the recently mortgaged proceeds to be used for (taken out only four days before the flood)?
+ Why were none of the recently mortgaged proceeds not invested in Johnstown in order to help its recovery?
+ How did the club’s charter end up in Allegheny County rather than Cambria County?
+ Whose idea was it for the club to be chartered in Allegheny County?
+ How was the Club funded?
+ What were the Club’s finances?
+ How and when were the flood control pipes removed?
+ Where did they go, who removed them and how did the control tower catch fire?
+ Why weren’t the flood control pipes reinstalled after Cambria Iron Company’s engineer recommended doing so and Cambria Iron Company expressed a willingness to foot part of the bill for that in order to ensure that the dam was repaired correctly – so that it was safe?

These questions go on ad nauseum. The fact is that this never went before a court – there never was a trial – and today we only have un-cross-examined statements that were taken by the PRR and designed only to help the issuer.

-While it is true that none of the lawsuits were tried in Cambria County, not all of them were tried in Allegheny County as, *The Bosses Club* asserts. With lack of documentation, it is difficult to ascertain just how fair many of these trials were and certainly the club members, particularly attorneys James Reed and Philander Knox had influence in the Pittsburgh legal community, but it is perfectly legal to petition to have cases removed to other locations, if there is fear that heavy media attention and news coverage of a “crime” will prevent a fair and unbiased jury from forming in the locality where the issue took place. In 1891, Jacob Strayer, a lumber dealer sued the club for $80,000, then he upped that number to $200,000. The case was first moved to Armstrong County, then Lycoming County, PA. (McGough, Michael R. *The Club and the 1889 Flood in Johnstown, Pennsylvania*. 2006[?], pp. 103-104).

-*The Bosses Club* brings to light that none of the records from any of these trials were kept and, it seems, to show that somehow the Club’s attorneys had them disappeared, but it is a common fact that documentation of court records, especially lawsuits, were not well kept, if kept at all in the 19th century. That there are no records left would be true of any lawsuits filed in the 19th century, not just those related to the Johnstown Flood.

I disagree, in a historical event like the Johnstown Flood you’d think it would dawn on someone to save these documents for historical accuracy unless it was advantages to have them disappear as soon as possible. Especially if owners of the law firm were also involved in the incident and the documents couldn’t prove your innocence, just your guilt. A law firm doesn’t just misplace or lose a roomful of documents unless it’s on purpose.

-*The Bosses Club* states that in moving to a new location, the files pertaining to the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club, belonging to the law firm of Knox & Reed of Pittsburgh, were somehow lost. This is true, but it happened in 1917, not 1919, as *The Bosses Club* indicates.

I will make that change in the revised edition.

49.) p. 325-“But for fairness and accuracy, my intent is to recognize Cambria Iron Company’s

 founder George S. King, innovator Daniel Morrell, and the City of Johnstown for

 their true and historic contributions.”

-Then do just that! This analyst thinks that the sections of the book that deal with steelmaking in Johnstown are very well done. This analyst couldn’t agree more that Johnstown’s role in steelmaking in America needs to be highlighted, showcased, and celebrated. The author of *The Bosses Club* has a more than valid point in wanting to showcase that. This analyst recommends that the author focus on the steel making and to leave the conspiracy theory elements out of the work.

It would be so easy to do what you are suggesting, but it would be a disservice to our history, to myself and to my readers: I would not be providing a full or complete story – I would be complying with your sanitized version of what happened.

I’ll admit that I went a little too far with the story that I was weaving because of my suspicion that Andrew Carnegie may have been involved. For instance, I shouldn’t have taken literary license by putting Carnegie on the lake with Henry Viering without also explaining via an Author’s Note that I was taking literary liberties by doing so. As you’ve pointed out there are numerous instances throughout that I need to correct in the next edition so that the reader doesn’t go on a “roller coaster ride” from fact to fiction and back to fact and inadvertently misunderstand when I’m conveying facts and when I’m speculating. And, so I can understand and appreciate why you have objections to *The Bosses Club*. In my own defense I was trying to do the prosecutor’s job via a tale spun from my conjectures and speculations of key character’s possible behavior based on their previous behavior and motive and my family’s oral stories.

My book is not historical – it is fiction – but my book does not lack facts, just the facts that are still missing from the historical record, I fill in with what I believe happened – my son calls it a historical fiction in the same genre as Herman Wouk’s “Winds of War” and “War and Remembrance”, both about World War Two and both without any citations by its author clarifying where he speculated and fictionalized and where he relied on factual historical accounts. However, that said, I understand and appreciate your reasons for asking me to identify where I have done so in order sell it in your stores.

But In the face of all the recent discoveries and documentation from the late professor Mr. Uldis Kakins and his associates Carrie Todd, Stephanie Wojno and Neil Coleman I hope the Nation Park Service and the analyst will reconsider their rigid position on the secondary spillway and be open minded to other possibilities.

50.) p. 346-“The destruction in the city [from the 1936 flood] was over forty million dollars;

 fifteen people lost their lives, and the infrastructure was heavily damaged.”

-According to the Johnstown Area Heritage Association, the death toll of the 1936 flood was, “About two dozen…” (<http://www.jaha.org/FloodMuseum/1936.html>)

I will update my book with the latest corrected figure.

51.) p. 349-78 people died in the 1977 flood.

-According to the Johnstown Area Heritage Association, 85 people died in the 1977 flood. (<http://www.jaha.org/FloodMuseum/1936.html>)

I will update my book with the latest figures.

52.) p. 356-“The Lemon House…to eat or sleep…”

-The Lemon House was not an inn.

I think you intended to refer to page 354. And, you’re right: I’ve mischaracterized The Lemon House by including in its amenities that travelers could sleep there. That’s incorrect. However, travelers could most certainly get food and drink at The Lemon House. I know there was also a Summit Mansion House nearby which was a hotel where travelers could sleep.

CITATION FROM “The LEMON HOUSE” BROCHURE:

Published by Easter National Park and Monument association in cooperation with Allegheny Portage Railroad National Historic Site, Pa

Emphasis added

*“It was probably never a hotel (there were larger places like the mile-distant Summit Mansion House for that),* ***though it was a stopping place for food and drink*** *– perhaps while teams of horses, and later steam locomotives, were affixed to the specially designed railroad cars for the journey west along the summit level, or while the railroad cars were being attached to the continuous rope for their journey down Incline No. 6.”*

53.) pp. 362-364-The Membership List of the South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club

-The Johnstown Flood National Memorial has one of the most complete as possible lists that contains 84 names (it’s very possible many of these names were just guests). This list is available at <http://www.nps.gov/jofl/learn/historyculture/people.htm>.

Thank you for sharing.